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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

GLEN P. WILLEY,

;
)

Appeal No. 93-0205-CA

)

District Court No. 91 490 0101

Plaintiff/Petitioner,
vs.
ROSALIND ANN JOHNSON WILLEY,
Defendant/Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF
CERTIORARI OF GLEN P. WILLEY

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
I.

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in substantially increasing the amount and

duration of the trial court's alimony award without evidence to support the award.
II.

Whether the Court of Appeals erred by awarding an amount of attorneys' fees

not sought by respondent and not based on any evidence in the record.
THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
The opinion of the Court of Appeals is found at Willey v. Willey, 287 Utah Adv.
Rep. 27 (Utah App. April 4, 1996). The opinion is attached as Exhibit 1 of the Addendum.
GROUNDS FOR SUPREME COURT JURISDICTION
/.

Date of Entry of Decision. The decision of the Court of Appeals was filed on

April 4, 1996.

1

2.

Petition for Writ of Certiorari.

The petition for writ of certiorari of

plaintiff/petitioner Glen P. Willey ("Mr. Willey") was filed within thirty days after the entry
of the final decision by the Court of Appeals, pursuant to rule 48(a) of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure.
3.

Statutory Basis for this Court's Jurisdiction. This appeal is properly before

this Court pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2-2(3)(a) and § 78-2-2(5) (Supp. 1995).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
This case is governed by UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-3 and § 30-3-5 (Supp. 1995).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case, This is a divorce action originally filed in 1991. This current
appeal was from an order of the trial court amending the decree of divorce on remand.
Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below. This case was originally tried in
November 1991.

The findings of fact and conclusions of law (hereinafter "Original

Findings"), and decree of divorce were entered on January 14, 1992 (Exhibits 2 and 3 of the
Addendum). Defendant/respondent Rosalind Ann Johnson Willey ("Ms. Willey") appealed
(the "First Appeal"). Willey v. Willey 866 P.2d 547 (Utah App. 1993) (Exhibit 4 of the
Addendum). In Willey, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court had not made the
requisite findings on each party's needs so that alimony could be determined. The Court
further held that the division of debt should also be considered in determining alimony.
Ms. Willey had also asserted that the court should include the expenses of her
children from a prior marriage in calculating alimony; the Court of Appeals rejected that
argument. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not have sufficient evidence
before it to impute income to Ms. Willey and invited the trial court to receive additional
evidence on that issue. Id at 554.
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The Court of Appeals also rejected Ms. Willey's arguments that the trial court erred
in failing to recognize her premarital equity in the marital home, finding that the equity had
been consumed by the parties.
The Court of Appeals also found that the trial court's findings concerning attorneys'
fees were inadequate and remanded for additional findings on that issue and directed the trial
court to consider attorneys' fees on appeal. Id.
Ms. Willey also appealed from an order of the trial court of April 5, 1993 (Exhibit 5
of Addendum), allowing Mr. Willey to offset payment of Ms. Willey's share of the marital
debt against his alimony obligation (the "Second Appeal").
After the Court of Appeals issued its original opinion on November 29, 1993, Ms.
Willey did not seek an immediate hearing to consider the issues remanded to the trial court.
Instead, on February 18, 1994, she filed a petition to modify the decree and a request for
temporary support. She also served extensive interrogatories and a request for production of
documents. Mr. Willey moved to dismiss the petition and for a protective order with respect
to the discovery. The domestic relations commissioner stayed the petition and granted the
motion for protective order. Ms. Willey objected to the commissioner's recommendation;
the trial court denied the objection.
In October of 1994, the trial court held a scheduling conference and entered a pretrial
order (Exhibit 6 of the Addendum). The court found that the record of the original trial
already contained sufficient evidence to determine the expenses of each party and that
findings on that issue could be made from the record. The court directed an evidentiary
hearing be held to determine the amount of income Ms. Willey was able to earn.
The evidentiary hearing took place on November 17, 1994.

The court heard

testimony from a vocational evaluator and from Ms. Willey's counsel as to attorneys' fees.
Neither party attempted to offer any other evidence.
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On January 31, 1995, the trial court issued a detailed memorandum decision. The
memorandum decision is attached as Exhibit 7 of the Addendum. At the court's direction,
Mr. Willey's counsel drafted findings and conclusions to which Ms. Willey's counsel
objected. The court entered the findings, conclusions, and order on March 7, 1995. The
findings of fact and conclusions of law (hereinafter "Findings on Remand"), and order are
attached as Exhibits 8 and 9 of the Addendum. Ms. Willey appealed the trial court's order of
March 7, 1995 (the "Third Appeal").
On April 18, 1995, the Court of Appeals entered an order consolidating the Second
and Third Appeals for purposes of briefing and decision.
The Court of Appeals issued its decision on the Second and Third Appeals on April 4,
1996, without oral argument. The Court of Appeals found that (1) the amount and duration
of the trial court's alimony award were not equitable, and (2) the trial court failed to make
adequate findings to support its award of attorney's fees.
Instead of remanding the case to the trial court for further findings, the Court of
Appeals issued its own order substantially increasing the amount and duration of the alimony
award and making a specific attorney's fees award.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Willeys were married on April 29, 1982.

Both parties had been married

previously. (Findings on Remand nos. 1 and 2.)
Ms. Willey had three children from her previous marriage; the parties had no children
together. In November 1990, the parties separated after eight years of marriage. (Findings
on Remand nos. 2-4.)
From the time the parties separated until the time of trial in November 1991, Mr.
Willey paid Ms. Willey monthly temporary support, which included payment of the
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mortgage on the marital residence in the amount of $2,492, temporary alimony in the amount
of $1,500, payment of Ms. Willey's car payment, and payment of a joint installment debt of
$360. Ms. Willey received temporary support during this year of separation in excess of
$4,500 per month. (Findings on Remand nos. 22 and 34)
The original trial took place on November 21 and 22, 1991. At trial, the trial court
found that Ms. Willey was capable of earning an income of between $1,500 and $2,000 per
month. Ms. Willey submitted to the trial court that her monthly living expenses were $2,678.
(Original Findings no. 12, Findings on Remand no. 17.)
The trial court awarded Ms. Willey alimony in the amount of $1,500 per month for
one year from the time of trial, and $1,000 per month for three years thereafter. The court
took into account the fact that Mr. Willey had already been supporting Ms. Willey for a year
since their separation. (Original Findings no. 12.)
In addition to alimony of $1,500 per month for the first year, the court awarded Ms.
Willey one-half of certain bonuses to be received by Mr. Willey. Early in 1992, Ms. Willey
received $6,562.39, representing her portion of such a bonus. (Original Findings no. 14,
Findings on Remand no. 35.)
The court awarded Ms. Willey attorney's fees of $5,000, finding that the $19,215
requested by Ms. Willey was not reasonable under the circumstances. (Original Findings no.
22, Findings on Remand nos. 46-49.)
After trial, Mr. Willey paid Ms. Willey alimony as ordered by the court. In addition,
Mr. Willey continued to pay the mortgage through October 1992, until the marital residence
was sold. Mr. Willey also paid Ms. Willey's share of the installment debt which she was
ordered to pay pursuant to the decree of divorce. (Findings on Remand nos. 30 and 34.)
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During 1991 and 1992, when Ms. Willey was receiving support equivalent to $4,300$4,500 per month, she did nothing to further her education or to obtain additional training to
enhance her earning capacity. (Findings on Remand no. 9.)
Mr. Willey was awarded a judgment in the amount of $18,840.86 against Ms. Willey
for Ms. Willey's share of the joint installment debt and the deficiency resulting from the sale
of the marital residence paid by Mr. Willey. (Order, 12, Exhibit 5 of Addendum.) The trial
court allowed Mr. Willey to offset the amount of the judgment against the amount he would
otherwise have been required to pay Ms. Willey. Id. Ms. Willey appealed this decision of
the trial court.
On remand, the trial court found that the reasonable monthly living expenses for each
party were $2,000. The court found that Mr. Willey had satisfied joint marital debt in the
amount of $37,681.71, of which Ms. Willey should have been responsible for half. The court
found that Ms. Willey should not reimburse Mr. Willey for her share of the joint marital debt,
and instead took the marital debt payment into account in fashioning the alimony award.
(Findings on Remand nos. 21, 31-34, and 40.)
Based on the testimony of the vocational evaluator, the court found that Ms. Willey
had the ability to earn $1,027.09 per month. (Findings on Remand no. 11.)
The court found that Ms. Willey had done nothing to pursue her education or to
increase her earning capacity during the parties' separation, trial, or pending appeals.
(Findings on Remand no. 9.)
Based in part upon the payment of marital debt made by Mr. Willey, the court did not
modify its original alimony award under the decree of divorce, but did award Ms. Willey an
additional $500 per month, in addition to the cost of tuition and books, to assist her in
furthering her education for any month she was a fully matriculated student at the University
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of Utah or comparable university for a period of nine quarters. (Findings on Remand nos. 15
and 16.)
The court found that all of the attorney's fees requested by Ms. Willey were not
reasonable and awarded Ms. Willey an additional $10,000 attorneys' fees. (Findings on
Remand nos. 45-50.)
The court entered its findings, conclusions, and order on March 7, 1995, and Ms.
Willey appealed.
Instead of remanding to the trial court for further findings, the Court of Appeals
issued its own ruling, awarding Ms. Willey alimony in the amount of $2,240 per month from
March 7, 1995, until March 6, 2000, unless sooner terminated or modified according to law.
The Court of Appeals did not indicate how this amount was calculated. Willey, 287 Utah
Adv. Rep. at 30.
The Court of Appeals also awarded Ms. Willey the additional $500 per month, in
addition to the cost of tuition, fees, and books, for each month she is enrolled as a full-time
student up to a maximum of nine quarters, not to extend past March 6, 2000. Id
Finally, the Court of Appeals awarded Ms. Willey a total of $37,554.38 for attorneys'
fees and costs incurred in connection with the trial and all three appeals. The Court of
Appeals did not explain the basis for this award. Id. at 32.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ARBITRARILY
INCREASING THE AMOUNT AND DURATION OF MS.
WILLEY'S ALIMONY AWARD

In its original findings, the trial court imputed income to Ms. Willey of $l,500-$2,000
per month. Ms. Willey claimed expenses of $2,678 per month. The trial court awarded her
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alimony of $1,500 per month for one year and $1,000 per month for three years thereafter.
Ms. Willey was also awarded one-half of any bonuses received by Mr. Willey.
After the First Appeal, the Court of Appeals remanded to the trial court for additional
findings with respect to the reasonable financial needs of the parties and the imputation of
income to Ms. Willey. After a hearing, the trial court issued a detailed memorandum
decision containing such findings.

The trial court found Ms. Willey's monthly living

expenses to be $2,000, imputed income to Ms. Willey of $1,027.09, kept the original alimony
award in place, and added an additional $500 per month for nine academic quarters, in
addition to the cost of tuition and books, for rehabilitative alimony.
On the Second and Third Appeals, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court again
did not make adequate findings and issued its own ruling on the amount and duration of
alimony, but without factual findings.
The standard of review for a trial court's award of alimony is abuse of discretion.
Rasbandv. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331 (Utah App. 1988). The trial court's award of alimony
will not be disturbed absent a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion.

Chambers v.

Chambers, 840 P.2d 841 (Utah App. 1992). The Court of Appeals should not overturn a trial
court's alimony ruling as long as the court supports its ruling with adequate findings and
exercises its discretion according to the proper standards. Bell v. Bell, 810 P.2d 489, 491
(Utah App. 1991).
Upon its second review, the Court of Appeals posed three questions with regard to the
trial court's award of alimony to Ms. Willey: First, whether the trial court erred in imputing
income to Ms. Willey; second, whether the trial court erred in determining the parties'
expenses; and third, whether the trial court erred in fashioning Ms. Willey's rehabilitative
alimony award.
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With regard to the imputation of income, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court
properly imputed income to Ms. Willey of $1,027.09 per month and said "[w]e do not disturb
these findings on appeal." Willey, 287 Utah Adv. Rep. at 28.
With regard to Ms. Willey's monthly living expenses, the Court of Appeals held that
the trial court's finding that Ms. Willey's monthly living expenses were $2,000 was
"speculative."

This holding is difficult to understand based on detailed findings by the trial

court, which in turn were based on testimony and evidence contained in the original trial
record. Exhibit 36-D, R. 440-42 (attached hereto as Exhibit 10 of the Addendum). The
Court of Appeals apparently rejected the trial court's adjustments to the amount of expenses
claimed and held that the amount of expenses submitted to the court at the time of trial was
the amount to be used for Ms. Willey's monthly living expenses. That amount was $2,678.
Notwithstanding this ruling, however, the Court of Appeals awarded Ms. Willey alimony of
$2,240 per month for five additional years from March 7, 1995, until March 6, 2000.
With regard to the rehabilitative alimony award, the Court of Appeals upheld the trial
court's award to Ms. Willey of an additional $500 per month while she is a fully matriculated
student, plus the cost of tuition and books, for a period equal to nine academic quarters to be
completed within five years. However, the Court of Appeals held that this rehabilitative
alimony award should coincide with its new alimony award for a period of five years.
Apparently, the Court of Appeals intended its "new" alimony award of $2,240 per
month to have a duration concurrent with the trial court's $500 per month award, which is
tied to Ms. Willey's furthering her education. However, the trial court did not award $500
per month for five years; rather, it awarded $500 per month for nine quarters-a few months
more than two years, if Ms. Willey chooses to be a student. Ms. Willey has five years in
The Court of Appeals said that the trial court considered a "stipulated" statement of the parties' reasonable
monthly expenditures. This is inaccurate. The trial court used the evidence submitted by Ms. Willey at the
original trial to determine her expenses. (Findings on Remand nos. 17 and 19.)
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which to complete her 2+ years of education. Clearly, the duration of the Court of Appeals'
award lacked any basis in the trial court's findings or in the evidence.
Further, the Court of Appeals approved the trial court's imputation of income to Ms.
Willey of $1,027.09 per month. Thus, if Ms. Willey does not attend school, she does not
need $2,240 per month in alimony to meet her needs whether her expenses are $2,240,
$2,000, or $2,678. In order to justify its award of alimony, the Court of Appeals would have
had to limit the time during which Mr. Willey is required to pay $2,240 to those months
during which Ms. Willey attends school.
Moreover, the Court of Appeals ignored the fact that Ms. Willey had already received
alimony for more than four years and that she failed to take any steps to improve her earning
capacity during that time. Under the findings of the trial court, Ms. Willey's income,
together with alimony for the years November 1991 through 1995, was adequate to meet her
reasonable expenses. (Findings on Remand no. 13). In addition, as the trial court pointed
out, Mr. Willey made the mortgage payment for the parties' home through October of 1992,
which decreased Ms. Willey's expenses for that time period. The Court of Appeals also
ignored the fact that Ms. Willey received $6,562.39 in 1992 as additional alimony, as a share
of Mr. Willey's bonus.
It is important to note that this was a second marriage for both parties. Ms. Willey
was already the mother of three children before her marriage to Mr. Willey and had
supported herself. She has a college degree and, as the trial court found, she could have
obtained a teaching certificate within one year and enhanced her earning capacity in that
manner. Within two years, Ms. Willey could have enhanced her earning capacity somewhere
between $9.58 and $12.41 per hour, had she furthered her education to become a marketing
expert or social worker. (Findings on Remand no. 14.)
It is clear that the Court of Appeals simply disagreed with the trial court's findings.
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[A] party seeking to overturn the trial court's findings has the burden of
marshaling the evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrating
that, despite such evidence, the findings are so lacking in support as to be
against the clear weight of the evidence and, therefore, clearly erroneous.
Crouse v. Crouse, 817 P.2d 836, 838 (Utah App. 1991). In this case, the Court of Appeals
has simply ignored the evidence supporting the findings of fact and ignored Ms. Willey's
failure to marshal the evidence supporting them and substituted its own judgment for that of
the trial court. "Although [an appellate] court may fashion its own remedy as a substitute for
the judgment of the trial court in equity cases, [it should] not disturb the trial court's
judgment only where necessary to prevent manifest injustice." (Citations omitted.) MacKay
v. Hardy, 896 P.2d 626, 629 (Utah 1995). It is obvious in this case that the Court of Appeals
thought that its new award of alimony was preventing manifest injustice. However, it is
difficult to see why it is manifest injustice for a trial court to award alimony for a period of
four years after trial in a case where the parties lived together for only eight years and where
the marriage was a second marriage for both parties. As the trial court found, Ms. Willey
was healthy and extremely intelligent. She has not offered any reason why she could not
have become rehabilitated and self-supporting within the time period during which she
originally received alimony.
The Court of Appeals has not indicated what evidence provided the basis for its award
of alimony. According to the reasoning of the Court's opinion, there would have had to have
been a finding of what Ms. Willey's reasonable expenses were in order to justify the award of
alimony. According to Ms. Willey, her expenses were $2,678.41 per month. However, the
Court of Appeals did not award that amount to her. The Court of Appeals accused the trial
court of making factual findings without basis in the evidence. However, the implied factual
findings on which the Court of Appeals' decision rests have no basis in the evidence.
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In arriving at its award, the Court of Appeals criticized the trial court for imposing
"speculation in the adjudicatory process" by finding Ms. Willey's monthly living expenses to
be $2,000. The Court of Appeals held that the correct amount to use for Ms. Willey's
monthly living expenses was the amount submitted at the time of trial, $2,678. The Court of
Appeals then set Ms. Willey's alimony award at $2,240, with no explanation as to how it
arrived at that figure. In essence, the Court of Appeals did exactly what it criticized the trial
court for doing-arbitrarily set an alimony amount without any factual findings that provide
support for such an award.
In contrast, the trial court's award was based on detailed findings.

The court

specifically said Ms. Willey testified at trial that her monthly expenses were $2,678.41
(Findings on Remand no. 17). The court found that:
[Defendant's automobile expense of $381.83 is unreasonably high and should
be reduced to $300 per month. Also, defendant's monthly unreimbursed
medical/dental expenses of $660 per month are unreasonably high and should
be reduced to $60 per month. While the record shows that defendant had
major surgery in the fall of 1991, there is nothing in the record to establish
why the ongoing expenses should continue on a monthly basis.
(Findings on Remand no. 19.) A trial court can properly reduce the amount of expenses
claimed. Thronson v. Thronson, 810 P.2d 428, 435 (Utah App. 1991). It is difficult to
determine what additional findings of fact the trial court could have made to support its
conclusion that Ms. Willey's reasonable monthly expenses were $2,000 per month. The
Court of Appeals did not explain in any manner its conclusion that the alimony should be set
at $2,240 per month. This does not coincide with the amount of monthly expenses found by
the trial court nor with what Ms. Willey asserted her monthly expenses were. It appears that
it is the Court of Appeals' award that is based on "improper speculation," not that of the trial
court.
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The Court of Appeals also extended the underlying alimony award for five years. In
making this decision, the Court of Appeals found that the underlying and rehabilitative
alimony awards should coincide. This finding ignores the alimony already received by Ms.
Willey since 1990. The trial court purposely did not extend the underlying alimony award
for the same period of time as the additional rehabilitative alimony awarded. The reason for
this was based on the excess support received by Ms. Willey during the separation and during
the first year after the divorce, together with Mr. Willey's payment of substantial joint marital
debt.
The record clearly establishes that during the year the parties were separated, Mr.
Willey paid Ms. Willey $1,500 in temporary support, in addition to paying the house
payment of $2,492 per month, joint marital installment debt of $360 per month, and Ms.
Willey's car payment. After the trial in November of 1991, Mr. Willey paid Ms. Willey
alimony, in addition to paying the house payment until October 1992, when the home was
sold. In addition, in early 1992, Ms. Willey received $6,562.39 as her share of Mr. Willey's
bonus. In late 1992, Mr. Willey paid over $37,000 of joint marital debt. Accordingly, for
two years, Ms. Willey received support in excess of her established needs. During that two
year period, Ms. Willey did nothing to obtain additional training or education or to help
increase her earning potential.
The Court of Appeals stated that both awards should continue for five years because
the trial court found that it was reasonable for rehabilitative alimony to continue for a period
of five years. This is not accurate. In setting the additional $500 per month rehabilitative
alimony, the trial court did not say that such an award should continue for five years. The
court awarded this amount for a period not to exceed nine quarters to be completed at an
educational institution within five years. This does not mean that Ms. Willey would receive
the rehabilitative alimony award for the full five years.
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The net effect of the Court of Appeals' award is to reward Ms. Willey for doing
nothing to increase her earning potential by doubling the amount of alimony awarded to her
for a period double the time originally ordered and to penalize Mr. Willey who paid the
original award. Based on the foregoing, the Court of Appeals' award of alimony and the
duration of that alimony constitutes error, and the decision of the Court of Appeals should be
reversed.

II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED BY ARBITRARILY
INCREASING
THE AMOUNT OF MS. WILLEY'S
ATTORNEY'S FEE AWARD.

At trial, Ms. Willey submitted evidence requesting attorney's fees in the amount of
$19,215 for 128.1 hours on the case billed at $150 per hour. The reasonableness of these fees
was challenged by Mr. Willey. The trial court found those fees to be unreasonable, stating
that combined attorneys' fees of $31,000 to $32,000 was an unfortunate use of funds. At
trial, the court awarded Ms. Willey $5,000 attorney's fees. On appeal, the Court remanded
the case to the trial court for additional findings with respect to the award of attorneys' fees.
On remand, the trial court made specific findings concerning the attorneys' fees at
issue. Specifically, the trial court found that "[a] great problem is encountered when the fees
are greatly out of proportion to the marital estate and the present and future financial
circumstances of the parties." (Memorandum Decision, Exhibit 7 of Addendum.) The court
entered the following specific findings with respect to the issue of attorneys' fees:
41.
With respect to the issue of the reasonableness of attorneys'
fees, the court notes that the district court's file is contained in two large
volumes. There are seven pages of docket entries describing pleadings and
filing activity. There have been sixteen court appearances in District Court
alone, in addition to the activity in the Court of Appeals.
42.
With respect to unusual or particular issues of law, defendant
argued that plaintiff had a continuing obligation to pay support for her
14

children from a prior marriage. This assertion was rejected by the trial court
and the Court of Appeals.
44.
In applying the factors to be considered in making an award of
attorney's fees, the court finds that this case was not and should not have been
particularly difficult. It was a relatively routine divorce of a couple with
extreme financial difficulties and disagreements on how to manage their
incomes and expenses.
45.
The court further finds that the efficiency of the attorneys in
handling the case was not good and the reasonableness of the number of hours
is excessive and beyond a reasonable evaluation of the case.
47.
While defendant's attorney does not request payment for all
recorded hours, he does request payment for 101 hours in the amount of
$15,150.00 for fees and costs of $1,539.38 for a total of $16,689.38. This
amount is presumably in addition to the $5,000.00 already paid by plaintiff for
defendant's attorney's fees after the trial.
49.
However, the amount of attorneys' fees charged in this case,
considering the marital estate, cannot justify the fees incurred. The parties'
net worth approached zero and the only meaningful asset was the plaintiffs
earning capacity which he brought into the marriage. The court finds that the
entire financial condition of the parties cannot justify combined attorneys' fees
in excess of $65,000, with little or no marital property remaining.
Accordingly, the court finds the fees are not reasonable.
The trial court found that Ms. Willey did not have the ability to pay attorney's fees,
but that Mr. Willey did. Accordingly, the court found that an additional $10,000 was a
reasonable amount to be awarded for attorney's fees.
A trial court's award of attorneys' fees should not be disturbed absent an abuse of
discretion. Bell, 810 P.2d 489. The trial court has broad discretion in awarding attorneys'
fees. Peterson v. Peterson, 818 P.2d 1305 (Utah App. 1991). Factors to be taken into
account in such an award are the financial need of the receiving spouse, the ability of the
other spouse to pay, and the reasonableness of the requested fees. Bell, 810 P.2d at 493. The
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trial court is encouraged to "make findings to explain the factors which they considered
relevant in arriving at an attorney fee award." Id. at 494 (citations omitted).
Upon its second review, the Court of Appeals stated that the trial court again failed to
make the necessary findings regarding attorneys' fees.

It is difficult to imagine what

additional findings as to reasonableness the trial court could have made to satisfy the Court of
Appeals. The trial court was not required to award all of the attorney's fees Ms. Willey
requested. Utah law does not require that; instead, it allows and requires the trial court to
assess reasonableness of the fees in making its award. Beals v. Beals, 682 P.2d 862 (Utah
1984). The trial court properly did so in this case.
The trial court examined the court's files, considered Ms. Willey's insistence upon
arguing a position on which she was unlikely to prevail, the difficulty of the litigation, the
efficiency of the attorneys, and the reasonableness of the number of hours. It was clearly in
the discretion of the trial court to award attorneys' fees which it found were reasonable, based
on all of the facts and circumstances of the case with which it was familiar. The trial court
properly reduced the attorney's fees requested on remand from $16,689.38 to $10,000.
The Court of Appeals rejected the trial court's award of attorney's fees and, without
explanation, awarded Ms. Willey a total of $36,015 in attorneys' fees, plus $1,539.38 in
costs, to cover fees and costs incurred at trial, remand, and on all the appeals. This amount
appears to have no relationship to the amount claimed by Ms. Willey for the trial~$19,215,
or for the proceedings on remand-$ 16,689.38, or to the amount she might have claimed for
the appeal. Instead, this is the total of all fees Ms. Willey claimed to have incurred between
the trial and the remand hearing. Ms. Willey did not even request that the court award this
amount because it included many other proceedings, such as her petition to modify. She
requested only $16,689.38 for the remand proceedings and the First Appeal.
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It is impossible to determine from the Court of Appeals' opinion how it arrived at the
amount of its award. The Court of Appeals offered no analysis, as required under Bell, to
support its award. In essence, the Court did exactly what it criticized the trial court for
doing-awarded an arbitrary amount of attorneys' fees with no supporting evidence.
In its remand decision, the trial court made detailed findings concerning the award of
attorneys' fees. The Court of Appeals erred in substituting its own arbitrary determination of
attorneys' fees for the trial court's well-supported award. The Court of Appeals said:
The trial court should have addressed the question of whether, under all the
relevant circumstances, Ms. Willey's attorney fees are reasonable. The factors
identified in Bell also permit an examination of the difficulty of the litigation,
the attorneys' efficiency, the reasonableness of the number of hours spent on
the case, the fee customarily charged in the locality, the amount involved in
the case and the result obtained, and the expertise and experience of the
attorneys involved.
Willey, 866 P.2d at 555.
In this case, the trial court did examine all those factors in its findings of fact nos. 41
through 51. The Court of Appeals said:
The critical determination to be made here is not the overall efficiency
of attorneys for both parties, but whether or not the fees sought by Ms. Willey
are reasonable under the circumstances of this case.
Willey, 287 Utah Adv. Rep. at 31.
The trial court made exactly that determination in reducing Ms. Willey's claimed fees
to $10,000. The Court of Appeals offered absolutely no rationale, justification, or calculation
of its award of $36,015, an amount not even claimed by Ms. Willey. The Court of Appeals
did not explain why that amount should cover the Second and Third Appeals or how it
increased or reduced the total fees claimed for the various proceedings to the amount
awarded.
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Because the Court of Appeals' attorney's fees award was arbitrary and unsupported
by evidence, the award should be reversed.

The award flies in the face of the well-

established Utah law that attorneys' fees awards must be supported by specific findings and
replaces it with the theory that the Court of Appeals can arbitrarily award attorneys' fees
without explanation.
CONCLUSION
In its decision in this case, the Court of Appeals has done exactly what it chastised the
trial court for doing—entered awards of alimony and attorney's fees that have no relationship
to the evidence presented. The findings of fact made by the trial court support its decision
with respect to alimony and attorney's fees. There are no findings of fact and, in fact, no
evidence in the record that would support the Court of Appeals' substitution of its own
awards of alimony and attorney's fees for the trial court's.
The decision by this panel of the Court of Appeals conflicts with prior
pronouncements of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals with respect to alimony and
attorneys' fees. The Court of Appeals has taken the position that it may substitute its own
judgment for that of the trial court without relying on the findings of fact of the trial court, or
pointing to any evidence which supports its new awards. In this way, the Court of Appeals
has rendered a decision that departs from the accepted and usual course of judicial
proceedings in such a way as to invoke an exercise of the Supreme Court's power of
supervision.
For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Willey's petition for writ of certiorari should be
granted.
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WILKINS, Judge:
This case has been before us previously on
appeal.
Because the trial court failed to make
adequate findings of fact, we remand[ed] for
the entry of appropriate findings, and a
reassessment of the awards in light of those
findings and our opinion, on (1) the award
of alimony, (2) the allocation of debt, and
(3) the award of attorney fees at trial and on
appeal. We otherwise affirm[ed] [the trial
court's prior decision].
Willey v. Willey, 866 P.2d 547, 556 (Utah App.
1993) (hereinafter Willey I). Ms. Willey again
challenges the proceedmgs m the trial court. We
reverse and remand for the entry of an amended
decree as herein described.

BACKGROUND
The factual background of this case is
well-described m Willey I. For our purposes, we
add only those facts and events necessary to
review the trial court's actions on remand
pursuant to our directions m Willey I.
In Willey /, we held that the trial court failed
to enter sufficient fmdmgs of fact in determining
Ms Willey's alimony award. Therefore, we
remanded this case and directed the trial court to
review the evidence and enter fmdmgs sufficient
for us to review its determinations regarding the
mcome imputed to Ms Willey, the tuning and
amount of Ms Willey's rehabilitative alimony
award, the allocation of the parties' debts, and
the basis for Ms Willey's limited award of
attorney fees at trial Willey /, 866 P.2d at
550-51, 554-56. We also directed the trial court

to determine and award to Ms Willey the
attorney fees she incurred m the Willey I appeal
Id. at 556.
On remand, the trial court took additional
evidence limited to Ms Willey's ability to earn
mcome. The court declined to allow discovery
of or testimony regarding Mr. Willey's
then-current ability to pay support or attorney
fees for Ms. Willey The court also declined to
allow evidence of Ms. Willey's then-current
ability to pay her attorney fees. Instead, the trial
court chose to rely upon evidence received at
trial regarding the parties' financial abilities.
Based upon the review ordered by this court
and the additional evidence presented below, the
trial court entered additional fmdmgs of fact on
some of the issues we directed it to address by
our remand order, but failed to address others.
The trial court revised the award of alimony,
considered the allocation of debt, and partially
addressed the questions raised regarding attorney
fees.
ISSUES RAISED ON APPEAL
Ms. Willey again challenges the adequacy of
the trial court's findings regarding alimony.
Specifically, she claims the trial court failed to
enter adequate fmdmgs regarding the duration of
alimony, resulting m an arbitrary termination of
that award. She also claims the trial court
entered findings of fact unsupported by the
evidence, resultmg m incorrect calculation and
consideration of alimony amounts.
Ms. Willey also claims the trial court abused
its discretion by prohibiting her from gomg
forward on a petition to modify the decree and
m denymg her request for discovery during the
course of the proceedmgs on remand.
In addition, Ms. Willey raises by a separate
but now consolidated appeal the question of
whether Mr. Willey may offset a post-decree
judgment entered m his favor and against Ms.
Willey, which arose from the allocation of the
marital debts, against his alimony obligation.
Finally, Ms. Willey also claims the trial court
failed to make and enter the findings required by
our holdmg m Willey I regarding the award of
attorney fees incurred at trial and attorney fees
on appeal, resultmg m an insufficient award of
fees.
ANALYSIS
We are troubled by the mcomplete resolution
of the issues raised m our remand order. Parties
to a divorce proceeding are rarely well-served
by repeated examination of the same issues. This
is particularly true m a case such as this, where
the financial resolution of the marital affairs
produces a loss for both parties To permit the
dispute to contmue is an injustice to the parties
Moreover,
[w]e approach the problem here presented m
full awareness of the standard rules which
favor the fmdmgs, judgments and decrees of
the trial court, particularly m divorce
matters. Notwithstanding this, the right of
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review on appeal has its purposes. . . .
[This court] would be remiss in its
responsibility and this assured right of
appeal would be meaningless if it
unquestioningly accepted all actions of the
trial court and remained insensitive to pleas
to
rectify
inequity
or
injustice.
Consequently, the rule is that when it is
made to appear that the court has failed to
correctly apply principles of law or equity,
. . or that the judgment has so failed to do
equity that it manifests a clear abuse of
discretion, this court on review will take
appropriate corrective action in the mterests
of justice.
Watson v. Watson, 561 P.2d 1072, 1073-74
(Utah 1977) (footnotes omitted).
I. Alimony
Ms Willey has raised three questions that we
agree must be addressed to resolve what alimony
award should be mcluded m the original divorce
decree. First, we consider whether the trial
court erred m imputing income to Ms. Willey.
Second, we address whether the trial court erred
m determining the parties' expenses. Finally, we
examme whether the trial court erred m
fashioning Ms. Willey's rehabilitative alimony
award "We will not overturn a trial court's
alimony ruling as long as the court supports its
ruling with adequate findings and exercises its
discretion according to the standards we have
set." Willey /, 866 P.2d at 550. We review the
trial court's conclusions of law with respect to
alimony awards for correctness, but we will not
reverse the court's findings of fact unless they
are clearly erroneous. Breinholt v Breinholty
905 P.2d 877, 879 (Utah App. 1995).

was $5.90 per hour, or $1,027.09 per month if
she worked full-time. At the time of trial Ms.
Willey was employed only part-time. We
therefore accept as implied the fmdmg
apparently relied upon by the trial court that Ms.
Willey is voluntarily underemployed, allowing
an imputation of mcome. Because the trial court
relied on evidence sufficiently detailed m its
fmdmgs of fact m imputmg mcome to Ms.
Willey, we hold that the court did not abuse its
discretion by imputmg mcome to Ms. Willey,
and we will not disturb the court's related
fmdmgs. Instead, we will use the court's
imputed mcome figures to further evaluate and
resolve the remammg alimony questions.
B. Reasonable financial needs of the parties.
On remand, the trial court considered a
stipulated statement of the parties' reasonable
monthly expenditures. Without
evidence
regarding these stipulated expenses, the trial
court reduced Ms. Willey's expenses by
$678.41, for a total of $2,000.00 per month, on
the basis of what appears to be speculation. In
the memorandum decision on remand, the trial
court commented that Ms. Willey's "medical
expenses surely must not be a monthly ongomg
amount of $660.00" and reduced them by
$600.00 to a total of $60.00. He also reduced
Ms. Willey's automobile expense of $381.83 by
the unlikely amount of $78.41. These reductions
lowered Ms. Willey's monthly expenses to an
even $2,000.00 per month. The trial court
likewise reduced Mr. Willey's expenses by
$463.16 agam to reach an even $2,000.00 per
month by reducmg the amount of Mr. Willey's
uncontested automobile expense, without
explanation, saymg only that Mr. Willey's
"automobile expenses can be similarly adjusted
down to reach a figure of $2,000.00 per month
for him."
The sheer absence of any evidence upon which
to base factual findings regarding these
adjustments makes them unacceptable. To allow
the trial court to impose speculation on the
adjudicatory process violates the basic premise
upon which our judicial system is founded. All
parties are absolutely entitled to a fair and
impartial hearing and adjudication of their
affairs. That did not occur m this case. We
cannot accept the adjustments made m the
parties' monthly expenses crafted by the trial
court m the apparent pursuit of round numbers.
For purposes of our correction of the divorce
decree, we accept the amounts the parties
submitted to the trial court as reflective of their
reasonable financial needs at the time of trial.

A. Income imputed to Ms. Willey,
On remand, we instructed the trial court to
review the question of how much mcome should
be imputed to Ms. Willey, if any. Willey /, 866
P 2d at 554. The trial court took additional
evidence on this question by admitting a
vocational counselor's testimony regarding her
evaluation of Ms Willey The trial court then
entered fmdmgs of fact imputmg monthly
income to Ms. Willey of $958.08 for 1992,
$991 61 for 1993, $1,026.32 for 1994, and
$1,062.24 for 1995 These fmdmgs were
premised upon the following evidence: at the
time of trial, Ms. Willey was employed
part-time at the rate of $5.00 per hour in a job
for which there were no full-time positions
available; Ms. Willey had previously worked
part-time m a clothing store m trade for
clothing; the vocational evaluator's testimony
that Ms. Willey was capable of obtaining
C. Rehabilitative alimony.
full-time employment at an average rate of $5.32
It is clear from the structure of the
per hour; and the vocational evaluator's
alimony award that it was mtended to
testimony that Ms. Willey could expect a 3.5
achieve a rehabilitative purpose. . . . Thus,
percent mcrease m salary each year. We do not
the court must make realistic assessments of
disturb these fmdmgs on appeal.
actual current mcome and actual expenses.
The court must also consider the time
Based on this evidence, the court found that
demands and expenses of attending school.
Ms. Willey's earning capacity at the time of trial
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS
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Absent such an assessment and appropriate
findings, there is no basis on which to
determine the proper amount and duration of
alimony needed to achieve a rehabilitative
outcome.
Willey I, 866 P.2d at 554.
We anticipated that on remand the trial court
would review the facts relevant to appellant's
rehabilitative alimony award. However, no
evidence regarding the
circumstances
surrounding Ms Willey's pursuit of further
education was sought by or presented to the
court. The trial court simply reconfirmed the
award of "additional alimony" of $500 per
month for "a maximum of nine quarters" of
university level education, plus the costs of
tuition and books. Mr. Willey is to pay all of
this to Ms. Willey, "provided such education is
completed within five years of January 1, 1995"
or "withm five years followmg the date of this
order," March 7, 1995.
Unfortunately, based upon other factual
fmdmgs made by the trial court, it is evident
that during the course of the proceedings in both
this court and the trial court that have followed
entry of the original divorce decree, Ms.
Willey's financial needs have not been met by
the alimony she has actually received. The
disparity is sufficient that for her to have
pursued university level education on a full-time
basis as contemplated by the trial court would
likely have made her a public charge. Because
she had not received the originally awarded
alimony, she could not have made use of any
"additional alimony."
We accept the trial court's fmdmgs that
rehabilitative alimony of $500 per month, plus
the costs of tuition and books, for a period equal
to that of nine academic quarters is warranted by
the facts of this case. The court found that Ms
Willey "could enhance her earning capacities
through obtaining further education," and
substantial evidence was presented to the court
by both parties that revealed a great disparity
between Mr. and Ms. Willey's earnings. The
trial court also implied a finding m its
conditional rehabilitative award that Ms. Willey
must maintain full-time student status for such
study to be appropriately beneficial. These
fmdmgs sufficiently support the rehabilitative
alimony award, and we affirm that portion of
the decree.
However, given the full-time nature of the
contemplated study and the parties' mcome and
needs, we find that the rehabilitative award also
contemplated a concurrence in time with the
original alimony awarded. How else may the
rehabilitative alimony be considered "additional
alimony9" As the trial court found, for Ms
Willey to attend full-time study, she must be
able to meet not only her reasonable monthly
expenses, but also the increased costs of
education. The trial court determined these
increased costs to be university costs, tuition,
books, and $500 per month, for the duration of
the nine quarters of anticipated study. An
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important purpose of alimony is to provide for
reasonable monthly expenses and to prevent Ms
Willey from becoming a public charge See
Jones \ Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah
1985).
Given these factors, and m reliance upon the
facts as found by the trial court, we hold that the
rehabilitative alimony award shall coincide with
the underlying alimony award, for the period
established by the trial court as reasonable, a
penod of five years. However, given the
confused, and mdeed patently unfair nature of
the prior order, under which Ms Willey was
required to elect one award or the other, we
extend the underlying alimony from March 7,
1995, for a penod of five years.
D. Alimony award to Ms. Willey.
As we discussed m Willey I, the Utah
Supreme Court has established a standard for
setting alimony. See Jones, 700 P.2d at 1075.
Under that standard, three factors must be
considered m fashioning a reasonable alimony
award: "[1] the financial conditions and needs of
the [spouse seeking support]; [2] the ability of
the [spouse seeking support] to produce a
sufficient mcome for [himself or] herself; and
[3] the abibty of the [payor spouse] to provide
support." Willey I, 866 P.2d at 550 (quotmg
Jones, 700 P.2d at 1075) (alterations m
original). We held m Willey I that the trial court
had abused its discretion because it failed to
consider all three of the Jones factors. Id. at
550-51.
This court has already recognized that the trial
court addressed the second Jones factor in its
original divorce decree, and we recognize that it
agam did so on remand. See id. However, m
Willey I, this court noted that the trial court
"made no findings on [Ms ] Willey's financial
need as the first Jones factor requires. Nor did
it make fmdmgs on Mr. Willey's financial need,
which underlying factual determination is
required for an assessment of the third Jones
factor, the ability of the payor spouse to provide
support." Id.
As we explained above, we accept the
amounts the parties submitted as reflective of
their reasonable financial needs at the time of
trial. We also have discussed our determination,
based upon findings made by the trial court, that
Ms Willey is m need of support to meet her
financial needs, which have not been met by the
alimony she has actually received. See Hall v
Hall, 858 P 2d 1018, 1025 (Utah App. 1993)
(explaining that this court may imply unstated
findings "if it is reasonable to assume that the
trial court actually considered the controverted
evidence and necessarily made a fmdmg to
resolve the controversy, but simply failed to
record the factual determination it made"), see
also State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 787 (Utah
1991) (explaining "m cases in which factual
issues are presented to and must be resolved by
the trial court but no fmdmgs of fact appear m
the record," the appellate court can ' assume that
CE REPORTS
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the tner of facts found them in accord with its
decision"); Adams v. Board of Review, 821 P.2d
1, 5 (Utah App. 1991) (MA finding may be
implied if it is clear from the record, and
therefore apparent upon review, that the finding
was actually made as part of the tribunal's
decision."). Also, based on the trial court's
findings and our above analysis, we find that
Mr. Willey is able to provide Ms. Wdley with
the financial support she needs. See Hall, 858
P.2d at 1018, 1025 (Utah App. 1993).
Based upon the facts as found by the trial
court, and upon the correction of errors
described above, Ms. Willey is awarded alimony
as follows:
1. From March 7, 1995, until March 6, 2000,
the sum of $2,240 00 as monthly alimony,
unless sooner terminated or modified according
to law.
2. As additional alimony, for the purpose of
assisting Ms. Willey m rehabilitation, and to
prevent her from becoming a public charge, the
sum of $500.00 per month for each month or
portion of a month during which she is duly
enrolled as a full-time student at the University
of Utah or similar institution, up to a maximum
of nme academic quarters over a period not to
extend past March 6, 2000, plus an amount
equal to the sum of tuition, fees, books, and
other costs directly incurred m pursumg that
education.

B. Offset of alimony.
In a separate but consolidated appeal, Ms.
Willey challenges the legality of allowing Mr.
Willey to offset marital debt Ms. Willey owed
him agamst the alimony obligation he owed Ms.
Willey This specific question was referred by
the trial court to the domestic commissioner for
review. After noting the obligation Ms Willey
owed to Mr. Willey arising from the marital
debts, and rejecting Mr Willey's suggestion that
it is inequitable to allow Ms. Willey to collect
alimony while leaving available to her the ability
to discharge the countervailing debt through
filing for bankruptcy, the commissioner focused
on what he considered to be more compelling
concerns. The commissioner stated:
[The] Commissioner also recognizes that
the Court's award of alimony recognized
[Ms. Wdley's] inability to meet her own
reasonable and necessary monthly living
expenses and [Mr. Willey's] ability to
contribute toward [Ms. Willey's] unmet
need. To allow [Mr. Willey] a total offset of
his alimony obligation against [Ms.
Willey's] obligation to [him] would frustrate
the purpose of the Court's award of
alimony.
The commissioner recommended that the trial
court require Mr. Willey to repay the total
amount of withheld alimony to Ms. Willey, and
to make ongomg alimony payments as required
by the divorce decree. The trial court rejected
this recommendation. Instead, m its order of
April 5, 1993, the trial court expressly allowed
Mr Wdley to "offset agamst [$18,840.86, the
amount of Mr. Willey's judgment agamst Ms.
Willey for the marital debt she owed to him,]
the alimony he would otherwise be required to
pay to [Ms. Willey]." In addition, the trial court
apparently took the offset amount into
consideration m reallocation of the marital debts
m Ms. Willey's favor.
Under the facts of this case, the trial court
erred by allowing Mr. Willey to offset the
alimony agamst Ms. Willey's debt to him.
Nonetheless, we have taken mto account the
inappropriate offset m extendmg Ms Wdley's
alimony. Therefore, we do not disturb the trial
court's allocation and award only because we
have awarded Ms Willey additional alimony to
facilitate the rehabditative award the tnal court
found appropriate. To also require Mr Wdley
to retroactively pay the alimony retamed under
the inappropriate offset would be inequitable and
unjust. Our resolution of the case does not
require reworking the debt allocation, nor does
it require us to revisit the tnal court's decision
to allow Mr. Willey to offset Ms Wdley's debt
to him agamst his alimony obligation.

II. Allocation of Debt
We have before us two related issues arising
from the allocation of the parties' marital debts.
First, we review the numerical allocation made
by the trial court Second, we consider Ms.
Willey's argument that the trial court improperly
allowed Mr. Willey to offset his alimony
obligation agamst Ms Willey's share of the
marital debt.
A. Allocation of marital debt.
After trial, the parties' marital residence was
sold at a loss. The resulting debt was divided
between the parties Other debts arising from
various loans and obligations were also divided
between the parties. However, Mr. Willey
voluntarily paid his and Ms Willey's marital
debts in full. As a result, the trial court allowed
Mr Willey to withhold alimony from Ms.
Willey to offset amounts Ms. Willey owed Mr.
Willey for repaying her share of the marital
debts On remand, the trial court considered Ms.
Willey's portion of the marital debts forgiven
because Mr. Willey had already fully paid Ms.
Willey's debts. As an exchange, the court did
not calculate the debt as a part of Ms. Willey's
needs m determining alimony.
The attorneys for both parties agreed to this
arrangement at trial on remand, and on appeal,
neither party challenges the trial court's action.
We therefore accept the resolution reached and
do not disturb this award

HI. Attorney Fees
The tnal court has agam failed to make the
necessary findings regarding attorney fees for
the ongmal tnal and proceedings m this case.
Furthermore, no findings have been made
regarding the appropnate amount of attorney
UTAH ADVANC:E REPORTS

Pfovo. Utah

287 Utah Adv. Rep. 27

Jl

fees to be awarded Ms. Willey for her prior directly regarding equitable matters, and to
successful appeal, as we "ordered. As we said in make the necessary findings on the issues not
reached by the trial court. See Owen v. Owen,
Willey I, the
579 P.2d 911, 913 (Utah 1978) (noting that
trial court may award attorney fees in
appellate court can review evidence and make its
divorce proceedings. Utah Code Ann.
own findings in divorce proceeding, which is in
§30-3-3 (Supp. 1993). "The award must be
equity); see also Thompson v. Thompson, 709
based on evidence of the financial need of
P.2d 360, 361 (Utah 1985) (per curiam) ("On
the receiving spouse, the ability of the other
appeal, we have broad equitable powers and are
spouse to pay, and the reasonableness of the
not necessarily bound or limited by the trial
requested fees/ Bell v. Bell, 810 P.2d 489,
court's findings."); Haddow v. Haddow, 707
493 (Utah App. 1991). "The decision to
P.2d 669, 671 (Utah 1985) ("[I]n reviewing a
make such an award and the amount thereof
trial court's actions in a divorce case, we are
rest primarily in the sound discretion of the
vested with broad equitable powers."). To do
trial court." Id. However, "[t]o permit
otherwise would subject both parties to the
meaningful review of the trial court's
unwarranted necessity of once again presenting
discretionary ruling, '[w]e have consistently
these questions to the trial court.
encouraged trial courts to make findings to
We accept the trial court's finding that Ms.
explain the factors which they considered
Willey was unable to pay attorney fees incurred
relevant in arriving at an attorney fee
in the course of the trial. We find no evidence
award.'" Id. at 494. . . .
to suggest her ability has improved. We
A court may consider, among other
therefore find her still in need of financial
factors, the difficulty of the litigation,
assistance to pay those fees.
the efficiency of the attorneys, the
We also accept and find no evidence requiring
reasonableness of the number of hours
us to revisit or revise the trial court's finding
spent on the case, the fee customarily
that Mr. Willey is financially able to assist Ms.
charged in the locality, the amount
Willey with payment of the attorney fees she
involved in the case and the result
incurred.
attained, and the expertise and
The trial court has twice expressed concern
experience of the attorneys involved.
that the total attorney fees incurred by the
Id., 810 P.2d at 493-94.
parties in the course of this litigation is
. . . However, the trial court did not
excessive considering the absence of any
independently assess . . . the reasonableness
financial net worth after deduction of the marital
of [Ms.] Willey's fees. The court merely
debts from the marital assets. We share that
noted ["the entire financial condition of the
concern. However, that is not the determining
parties cannot justify combined attorney's
issue. See Bell v. Bell, 810 P.2d 489, 493-94
fees in excess of $65,000 with little or no
(Utah App. 1991). The trial court should have
marital property remaining"]. While this
addressed the question of whether, under all the
statement may indicate the trial court
relevant circumstances, Ms. Willey's attorney
believed both parties' fees were
fees are reasonable. The factors identified in
unreasonable, it does not constitute a finding
Bell also permit an examination of the difficulty
addressing the reasonableness of [Ms.]
of the litigation, the attorneys' efficiency, the
Willey's attorney fees according to the Bell
reasonableness of the number of hours spent on
factors.
the case, the fee customarily charged in the
Willey I, 866 P.2d at 555-56.
While the trial court has entered findings locality, the amount involved in the case and the
regarding Ms. Willey's financial ability to pay result obtained, and the expertise and experience
attorney fees necessitated by the trial, no of the attorneys involved. Willey I, 866 P.2d at
findings regarding her ability to pay fees 555.
incurred on appeal have been made. The trial
The trial court found that this litigation should
court found that Mr. Willey had the ability to not have been difficult, that the efficiency of
pay Ms. Willey's attorney fees. However, the both attorneys was not good, that the number of
trial court failed to make specific findings total hours for which the attorneys have billed is
regarding the reasonableness of Ms. Willey's excessive under the circumstances of this case,
fees at trial and on appeal.
that Ms. Willey's attorney presented evidence of
In this case the trial court has twice failed to $19,215.00 in fees as of the time of trial, and a
address and make the necessary factual total of $36,015.00 as of the time of the hearing
determinations. In the interests of finality, and on remand, for which Ms. Willey sought
to avoid subjecting the parties to even more reimbursement of $15,150.00 for fees and
expense and difficulty in resolving what should $1,539.38 in costs at the time of the hearing on
have been a routine part of the case, we are remand. The trial court also found Ms. Willey's
constrained to make our own determination on attorney's hourly rate of $150 to be reasonable,
the issue. Fairness to both parties demands such given his experience and expertise. We do not
a resolution.
disturb these findings.
Rather than remanding again for the trial court
The critical determination to be made here is
to examine these same issues, we will exercise not the overall efficiency of attorneys for both
our equitable power to review the evidence parties, but whether or not the fees sought by
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS

36

>w,

Ms. Willey are reasonable under the
circumstances of this case. At the time of the
hearing on remand, Ms. Willey sought
reimbursement of $20,150 from a total of
$36,015 she is obligated to pay. Of this amount,
Mr. Willey had already been ordered to pay
$5,000.00. Without adequate explanation or
findings, on remand the trial court ordered Mr.
Willey to pay an additional $10,000 as the
correct adjustment.
Under the unique circumstances of this case
we award Ms. Willey a total of $36,015.00 in
attorney fees, plus $1,539.38 in costs, for fees
and costs incurred at trial, on appeal, on
remand, and on this appeal. All other fees and
costs incurred herein by either party, including
those incurred in the course of this second
appeal, shall be the sole obligation of the party
incurring those expenses.
CONCLUSION
We reverse and remand to the trial court for
entry of an amended decree as is necessary to
correct the alimony award to include the sum of
$2,240.00 per month effective March 7, 1995,
and continuing until five years from that date.
This award shall be subject to termination or
modification according to law. The order shall
include the rehabilitative award previously
described in this opinion, with the provision that
it shall be available from March 7, 1995, and
continuing until five years from that date.
Finally, the order shall include a total of
$37,554.38 awarded to Ms. Willey for attorney
fees and costs incurred in the entire course of
these proceedings. Any amount Mr. Willey
actually paid to Ms. Willey for attorney fees
under any prior trial court order shall be
credited against this award of fees and costs.
Reversed and remanded for entry of an order
consistent with this opinion.
Michael J. Wilkins, Judge
WE CONCUR:
James Z. Davis, Associate Presiding Judge
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge
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IN THE
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
Carolyn Marie ENDRODY,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
Laszlo ENDRODY Jr., Endrody Trust, et
al.,
Defendants and Appellees.
No. 940753-CA
FILED: April 4, 1996
Fifth District, Iron County
The Honorable J. Philip Eves
ATTORNEYS:
Michael W. Park and James M. Park, St.
George, for Appellant
Deborah D. Blackburn, Cedar City, for
Appellee Laszlo Endrody Jr.
Michael A. Day, St. George, for Appellee
Endrody Trust and All Other Appellees
Before Judges Bench, Billings, and Greenwood.
This opinion is subject to revision before
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
GREENWOOD, Judge:
Carolyn Endrody (Ms. Endrody) appeals the
trial court's awards of marital property,
alimony, and attorney fees. The Endrody Trust
(the Trust) responds only to Ms. Endrody's
challenge regarding the determination of marital
property. Laszlo Endrody Jr. (Mr. Endrody)
responds to all of the issues raised by Ms.
Endrody.1 We affirm in part and remand in part.
BACKGROUND
Mr. Endrody, a former sea captain, was
employed as a Panama Canal pilot beginning in
early 1975. Ms. Endrody met Mr. Endrody
while she was serving in the U.S. military in
Panama, and the parties married on April 11,
1975. The parties lived in Panama until 1979,
during which time two children were born.
In 1979, the parties established residence in
Iron County, Utah where they lived on a
working ranch (the Endrody Ranch) owned by
Mr. Endrody and his parents. Ms. Endrody
lived at the Endrody Ranch with the parties' two
children, and Mr. Endrody spent his leave time
there, while continuing his employment with the
Panama Canal. The Endrody Ranch had been
purchased by Mr. Endrody's parents in 1970 for
$80,000. The parents made a $25,000 down
payment on the property, and paid annual
payments on the remaining balance. Prior to the
marriage of the parties, Mr. Endrody entered
into a rental agreement with his parents, under
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ELLEN MAYCOCK - 2131
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK
A Professional Corporation
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Eighth Floor, Valley Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801)531-7090
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
GLENP.WILLEY,

)

Plaintiff,

)

vs.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

)

ROSALIND ANN JOHNSON WILLE Y, )
Defendant.

)

Civil No. 91 490 0101
Judge David S. Young

)

The above-entitled matter came on for trial on November 21 and 22, 1991.
Plaintiff was present and represented by his counsel, Ellen Maycock, and defendant
was present and represented by her counsel, Roger Sandack. The court having heard
testimony, received exhibits, heard the arguments of counsel, and being fully
advised, now makes and enters the following:
Findings of Fact
1.

Residence. Plaintiff and defendant were bona fide residents of Salt Lake

County, Utah, for more than three months prior to the filing of this action.
2.

Marriage. Plaintiff and defendant are husband and wife having been

married on April 29,1982, in Salt Lake County, Utah.

3.

Children. No children have been born as issue of this marriage, and none

are expected.
4.

Grounds for Divorce. During the marriage, irreconcilable differences have

developed between the parties making continuation of their marriage impossible.
Each party is entitled to a decree of divorce from the other party.
5.

Real Property. During the marriage, the parties acquired a house and real

property located at 2605 East Maywood Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah. The house
should be sold as soon as feasible because it constitutes a substantial financial burden
for the parties. The house should be listed at a price of $350,000 with a new real
estate agent to be agreed upon by the parties as soon as the present listing agreement
expires. Upon sale of the house, the first mortgage in the approximate amount of
$232,000 to Zions Bank should be paid in full, and the second mortgage in the
approximate amount of $80,000 to Beverly Johnson should be paid in full, together
with all costs of sale. Any net proceeds of the sale then remaining should be divided
as follows:
(a)

If the house is sold within 90 days of the date of November 22, 1991,

all remaining net proceeds of sale should be awarded to defendant.
(b)

If the house is sold after the expiration of 90 days from November 22,

1991, the parties should divide any net proceeds equally.
(c)

In the event that the sales price of the house is not sufficient to pay

the first and second mortgages and costs of sale, the parties shall be equally
responsible for payment of any short fall or deficiency.
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Plaintiff should continue to make the first mortgage payment until the house is
sold. Payment of the second mortgage shall continue to be deferred. Defendant may
remain in possession of the house until it is sold.
6.

Automobiles. The court finds, based on the parties' stipulation, that the

1988 Landcruiser has a net value, after payment of the encumbrance thereon, of
$7,000. The Landcruiser shall be awarded to defendant. The court finds that the
1987 Mercedes has no equity, since it is subject to a lease agreement. Plaintiff should
assume and pay the lease payments, and hold defendant harmless therefrom.
7.

Individual Retirement Account. The individual retirement account in the

name of Rosalind Willey should be divided as follows:
(a)

The stock in American Telephone and Telegraph should be awarded

to defendant since it was a family gift to her.
(b)

The cash amounts in the individual retirement account should be

divided equally between the parties.
8.

401K Plan. The 401K plan has a net value of approximately $24,000,

which should be divided equally between the parties. Plaintiff should repay the loan
to the 401K plan and should be entitled to the benefit of any increase in the value of
the 40 IK plan accrued as a result of the payment of the loan.
9.

Furniture and Personal Property. The furniture in the parties' home

should be awarded to defendant. The furniture acquired by plaintiff after the parties'
separation should be awarded to him, and he should assume and pay any obligations
incurred in connection therewith. In addition, plaintiff should be awarded the
following personal items currently located in the parties' home:
(a)

Oak chair in den;
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(b)

Oak table and chairs (presently being stored);

(c)

Plaintiffs books;

(d)

Framed maps in the den;

(e)

Framed birds in the master bedroom;

(f)

Brass bird bookends;

(g)

Carved arctic loon; and

(h)

Butter churn.

Each party should be awarded the other personal property presently in his or her
possession.
10.

J. G. Willey Limited Partnership. Based on the stipulation of the parties,

the court finds that this is a premarital asset of no value and awards it to plaintiff.
11.

Pension Plan. Plaintiff currently has a pension plan with his employer,

Kidder, Peabody & Company. The pension plan should be divided between the
parties pursuant to the Woodward formula as of November 21, 1991, pursuant to a
qualified domestic relations order.
12.

Alimony. The court finds that a reasonable average income to use for

plaintiff in determining alimony to be paid in this matter is $110,000. Because of
plaintiffs employment as a stock broker, his income has fluctuated. In 1987 and
1991, plaintiff had unusually good income years. The court further finds that
defendant is capable of earning an income of between $1,500 and $2,000 per month,
based on her education and qualifications. Accordingly, the court finds that it is
equitable that plaintiff pay alimony to defendant of $1,500 per month for one year
from the date of trial herein, and $1,000 per month for three years thereafter. The
court further finds that plaintiff has been supporting defendant during the parties'
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separation of approximately one year, and it is appropriate to take that time period
into account in determining the term of alimony. Alimony shall terminate at the end
of four years from the date of trial, or when defendant remarries, cohabits with a
member of the opposite sex, or dies, whichever first occurs.
13.

Decree of Divorce. The decree of divorce herein should be final upon

January 1,1992.
14.

Deferred Compensation and Bonuses. The court finds that based on work

already performed by plaintiff as an employee of Kidder, Peabody & Company, he is
entitled to a bonus in January of 1992. The amount of that bonus should be divided
equally between the parties. The court further finds that future bonuses, which
plaintiff is entitled to be paid in 1995 and 1996, have been earned as of this time and
are contingent only upon plaintiffs continued employment with Kidder, Peabody &
Company. Accordingly, if plaintiff is still employed by Kidder, Peabody & Company
and receives those bonuses, the amount of those bonuses should be divided equally
between the parties. The court further finds that plaintiffs deferred compensation
for 1991 will be used to pay ongoing expenses and should not otherwise be divided be
the parties. Each party shall be responsible for the payment of taxes on the portion of
the bonuses distributed to that party.
15.

Claim of Premarital Contribution. Defendant asserted a claim in this

matter that she made a premarital contribution to the marriage of approximately
$29,000, consisting of the equity in the home owned by her located on Logan Avenue
prior to the marriage. The court finds that the funds received upon the sale of the
Logan Avenue house in 1983 were commingled with other funds of the parties by
their choice and have lost their separate character as premarital property.
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Accordingly, the court makes no award as a result of the claimed premarital
contribution.
16.

Joint Tax Return. The parties shall file a joint income tax return for 1991

and divide any refunds to be received equally. In the event that taxes are due, the
parties shall each pay one-half of any taxes.
17.

Medical Expenses of Defendant.

Defendant underwent surgery in

September of 1991. The medical expenses incurred in connection with that surgery
have been submitted for payment to plaintiffs health insurance provider. Any of
those expenses not paid by insurance should be paid from plaintiffs Complus Plan
insofar as there are sufficient funds in the plan to do so. In the event that the
Complus Plan does not cover all of those medical expenses, plaintiff should be
responsible for payment.
18.

First Interstate Advance Line. During the marriage, plaintiff and

defendant had a credit line with First Interstate Bank. The court finds that the credit
line was incurred to cover family expenses. Each party should pay one-half of the
amount due on the credit line as of November 21,1991.
19.

Other Debts and Obligations. Any debts and obligations incurred by the

parties since their separation should be paid by the party who incurred them. The
court finds that defendant is not entitled to be reimbursed for tuition incurred by her
for Spring Quarter of 1991.
20.

Obligation of Blake Johnson.

Blake Johnson owes the parties

approximately $2,000 which he pays to them at the rate of approximately $100 per
month. Defendant should be entitled to receive the payments from Blake Johnson.
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21.

State Tax Refund for 1990. The state income tax refund for 1990 should be

divided equally between the parties.
22.

Attorneys' Fees and Costs. Plaintiff has previously paid $1,950 toward

defendant's attorney's fees and should be required to pay an additional $3,500 toward
defendant's attorney's fees. Otherwise, each party should pay his or her own costs
and fees incurred herein.
From the foregoing findings of fact, the court now makes an enters the
following:
Conclusions of Law
1.

Each party should be awarded a decree of divorce from the other party, to

become final upon January 1,1992.
2.

The real and personal property of the parties should be awarded as set

forth in paragraphs 5, 6, 7, 8, 9,10,11, and 20 of the findings of fact herein.
3.

The court should enter a qualified domestic relations order with respect to

the division of the pension plan as set forth in paragraph 11 of the findings of fact
herein.
4.

Plaintiff should be ordered to pay alimony to defendant as set forth in

paragraph 12 of the findings of fact herein.
5.

Future bonuses to plaintiff through Kidder, Peabody & Company in 1992,

1995, and 1996, should be divided between the parties as set forth in paragraph 14 of
the findings of fact herein. Plaintiffs deferred compensation for 1991 should be used
to pay the ongoing expenses and should not otherwise be divided by the parties. Each
party should be ordered to pay the taxes due on the portion of the bonuses distributed
to that party.
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6.

Defendant is not entitled to an award of a premarital contribution in the

amount of $29,000, as set forth in paragraph 15 of the findings of fact herein.
7.

The parties should file a joint income tax return for 1991 and should be

ordered to divide any refunds to be received equally. The parties should each be
ordered to pay one-half of any taxes.
8.

Any of defendant's surgery expenses not paid by insurance should be paid

from plaintiffs Complus Plan, insofar as there are sufficient funds in the plan to do
so. In the event that the Complus Plan does not cover all of those medical expenses,
plaintiff should be responsible for payment.
9.

The parties should be ordered to pay the debts and obligations incurred

during the marriage as set forth in paragraphs 18,19, and 20.
10.

The state income tax refund for 1990 should be awarded equally between

the parties,
11.

Plaintiff should be ordered to pay an additional $3,500 toward defendant's

attorney's fees. Otherwise, each party should be ordered to pay his or her own costs
and fees incurred herein.
DATED this / V*^clav^fJanuary, 1992.
BY THE COURT:
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to be delivered to the
following, this 30th day of December, 1991:
Roger D. Sandack, Esq.
500 Reams Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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Eighth Floor, Valley Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801)531-7090
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
GLENP.WILLEY,
Plaintiff,

DECREE OF DIVORCE

9rna34

vs.
ROSALIND ANN JOHNSON WHLEY,
Defendant.

Civil No. 91 490 0101
Judge David S. Young

The above-entitled matter came on for trial on November 21 and 22, 1991.
Plaintiff was present and represented by his counsel, Ellen Maycock, and defendant
was present and represented by her counsel, Roger Sandack. The court having heard
testimony, received exhibits, heard the arguments of counsel, and being fully
advised, and having made and entered itsfindingsof fact and conclusions of law,

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
DECREED:
1.

Decree of Divorce. Plaintiff Glen P. Willey is hereby awarded a decree

of divorce from defendant Rosalind Ann Johnson Willey, and defendant Rosalind Ann
Johnson Willey is hereby awarded a decree of divorce from plaintiff Glen P. Willey,

on grounds of irreconcilable differences, such decree to become final on January 1,
1992.
2.

Real P r o p e r t y .

The house and real property located at 2605 East

Maywood Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah is ordered to be sold as soon as feasible. The
house shall be listed at a price of $350,000 with a new real estate agent to be agreed
upon by the parties, as soon as the present listing agreement expires. Upon sale of
the house, the first mortgage in the approximate amount of $232,000 to Zions Bank is
ordered to be paid in full, and the second mortgage in the approximate amount of
$80,000 to Beverly Johnson is ordered to be paid in full, together with all costs of sale.
Any net proceeds of the sale then remaining are ordered to be divided as follows:
(a)

If the house is sold within 90 days of the date of November 22, 1991,

all remaining net proceeds of sale are awarded to defendant.
(b)

If the house is sold after the expiration of 90 days from November 22,

1991, the parties are ordered to divide any net proceeds equally.
(c)

In the event that the sales price of the house is not sufficient to pay

the first and second mortgages and costs of sale, the parties are ordered to be
equally responsible for payment of any short fall or deficiency.
Plaintiff is ordered to continue to make the first mortgage payment until the
house is sold. Payment of the second mortgage shall continue to be deferred.
Defendant may remain in possession of the house until it is sold.
3.

Automobiles. The Landcruiser is awarded to defendant.

Plaintiff is

ordered to assume and pay the lease payments on the 1987 Mercedes, and hold
defendant harmless therefrom.
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4.

Individual Retirement A c c o u n t The individual retirement account in

the name of Rosalind Willey is ordered to be divided as follows:
(a)

The stock in American Telephone and Telegraph is awarded to

defendant since it was a family gift to her.
(b)

The cash amounts in the individual retirement account are ordered

to be divided equally between the parties.
5.

401K Plan. The 401K plan having a net value of approximately $24,000

is ordered to be divided equally between the parties. Plaintiff is ordered to repay the
loan to the 401K plan and is awarded the benefit of any increase in the value of the
40 IK plan accrued as a result of the payment of the loan.
6.

Furniture and Personal Property. The furniture in the parties' home

is awarded to defendant. The furniture acquired by plaintiff since the parties'
separation is awarded to him, and he is ordered to assume and pay any obligations
incurred in connection therewith. In addition, plaintiff is awarded the following
personal items currently located in the parties' home:
(a)

Oak chair in den;

(b)

Oak table and chairs (presently being stored);

(c)

Plaintiffs books;

(d)

Framed maps in the den;

(e)

Framed birds in the master bedroom;

(f)

Brass bird bookends;

(g)

Carved arctic loon; and

(h)

Butter churn.

Each party is awarded the other personal property presently in his or her possession.
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7.

J. G. Willey Limited Partnership. The J. G. Willey Limited Partnership

is awarded to plaintiff.
8.

Pension Plan. The pension plan with Kidder, Peabody & Company is

ordered to be divided between the parties pursuant to the Woodward formula as of
November 21, 1991, pursuant to a qualified domestic relations order.
9.

Alimony. Plaintiff is ordered to pay alimony to defendant in the amount

of $1,500 per month for one year from the date of trial herein, and $1,000 per month
for three years thereafter. Alimony shall terminate at the end of four years from the
date of trial, or when defendant remarries, cohabits with a member of the opposite
sex, or dies, whichever first occurs.
10.

Deferred Compensation and Bonuses. The amount of the bonus

plaintiff is entitled to in January of 1992 as a result of his employment with Kidder,
Peabody & Company is ordered to be divided equally between the parties. Any future
bonuses which plaintiff is entitled to be paid in 1995 and 1996, and which have been
earned as of this time and are contingent only upon plaintiffs continued employment
with Kidder, Peabody & Company, are ordered to be divided equally between the
parties. Plaintiffs deferred compensation for 1991 is ordered to be used to pay
ongoing expenses and shall not otherwise be divided be the parties. Each party is
ordered to pay the taxes on the portion of the bonuses distributed to that party.
11.

Joint Tax Return. The parties are ordered to file a joint income tax

return for 1991 and divide any refunds to be received equally. In the event that taxes
are due, the parties are ordered to each pay one-half of any taxes.
12.

Medical Expenses of Defendant. Any medical expenses incurred by

defendant in connection with her surgery in September of 1991 which have not been
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paid by plaintiffs health insurance provider shall be paid from plaintiffs Complus
Plan, insofar as there are sufficient funds in the plan to do so. In the event that the
Complus Plan does not cover all of those medical expenses, plaintiff is ordered to be
responsible for payment.
13.

First Interstate Advance Line. Each party is ordered to pay one-half of

the amount due on the credit line with First Interstate Bank as of November 21,
1991.
14.

Other Debts and Obligations. Any debts and obligations incurred by

the parties since their separation are ordered to be paid by the party who incurred
them.
15.

Obligation of Blake J o h n s o n . Defendant is awarded the obligation

from Blake Johnson of $2,0U0, which he pays at the rate of approximately $100 per
month.
16.

State Tax Refund for 1990. The state income tax refund for 1990 is

ordered to be divided equally between the parties.
17.

Attorneys' Fees and Costs. Plaintiff is ordered to pay an additional

$3,500 toward defendant's attorney's fees. Otherwise, each party is ordered to pay his
or her own costs and fees incurred herein.
DATED this j ^ d a y of January, 1992.
BY THE COURT:
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BENCH and JACKSON, JJ., concur.

Glen P. WILLEY, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.

Rosalind Ann Johnson WILLEY,
Defendant and Appellant.
No. 920091-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Nov. 29, 1993.

In divorce action, the Third District
Court, Salt Lake County, David S. Young, J.,
divided marital proper.'/, granted alimony
and awarded wire attorney (ees. Wife appealed. The Court of Appeals. Biiiir.gs. ? J,
held that trial court (zil»d to make sufficient
findings to support aware of alimony, allocation of debt and award of attorney fees.
Affirmed in part, and reversed and remanded in part.

1. Divorce 02S6(3.i)
Court of Appeals wil not overturn trial
court's alimony ruling as long as court supports its ruling with adequate fir.dr.gs and
exercises its discretion according to governing standard.
2. Divorce c=>239
In fixing reasonable alimony award, trial
court must make sufficiently detailed findings on each of the governing factors to
enable reviewing court to insure that trial
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court s discretionary determination was rationally based upon those factors.
3. Divorce 0 2 3 9
In setting alimony award, rial court
failed to make required r.ndings regarding
parties' financial need.
4. Divorce C=»237
In determining husband's alimony obligation, trial court failed to adjust ei:her party's financial needs to account for debt payments each would owe on bank line or credit
after court's property distribution, or probable result of sale of marital home in assessing
the parties' respective needs.
5. Divorce C=»252.4
Trial court did not abuse its discretion in
dividing debt for second mortgage between
the parties, despite wife's contention that
husband should have been individually responsible for mortgage because portion of
money borrowed from her parents, secured
by crust d^d against the house, was used for
purchase of couple's automobile.
6. Divorce e=>237
Since husband had duty of supporting
stepchildren only during prior marriage, expenses of his former stepchildren were not to
be considered in determining his financial
need and award of alimony to wife from
subsequent marriage. U.C.A.1953. TS—45—i.
7. Divorce 0 2 3 7
In calculating husband's alimony obligation, expenses of mother's children from
former marriage were not to be considered.
where children's father was paying support
required under the guidelines.
S. Divorce e=>239
In determining husband's alimony obligation, trial court did not abuse its discretion
in setting wire's earnings at SS60 per month
based on projection of full-time work at her
current salary, but there was no basis for
trial court's finding that wife could earn
.51.500 to .$2,000 per month within a year or
two.
9. Divorce 0 2 4 7
To extent that alimony award is intended to be rehabilitative, its goal is to close the

gap between actual expenses ar.c
come to enable receiving spouse
better able to support himself
when alimony and schooling end
10. Divorce <5=>247
In fashioning award of rehab
mony, court must make realistic a
of actual current income and actu:
and must consider time deman;
penses of attending school.
11. Divorce c=252.5(l)
Wife had no equity in mariU
rived from proceeds of sale of her
home, where any premarital equi
sumed during the marriage.
12. Divorce C=>224
Award of attorney fees in c
must be based on evidence of fin
of receiving spouse, ability of othe
pay, and reasonableness of requ
ii.C.A.1953. 3CW-3.
13. Divorce C=>223t 227(1)
Decision to award attorney
vorce case and amount thereof re
iy in sound discretion of trial COL
1953. 30-3-3.
14. Divorce e=>226
Trial court, in awarding wife
ly 25?tf of her requested attorney
to address reasonableness of su
cording to governing factors, ar
findings regarding either wife's a
her own attorney fees or husbanc
oav her fees. (J.C.A.1953, 30-3-

Roger D. Sandack. Salt Lake C
for defendant and appellant.
Ellen Maycock. Salt Lake City.
plaintiff and appellee.
Before BILLINGS. P.J.. and 3
ORME, JJ.
BILLINGS. Presiding Judge:
Rosalind Willey appeals the
decisions in this divorce action
division of marital property, and
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attorney fees. Because of insufficient nndir.P' NV- I - V * r s ^ 1 7 ^ :*svi:\d t:.e co\^r.'s rdir.gs o n a ^ :r - ori ? anc* & e awa - r ^ of a;:orr.ey
f*es. ^ 2 ^ i 0 r 2 V — 2 ar-d remand che propertv division co give the court che opportunity to reconsider these related financial asWe otherwise aifirrn.
0ects of the divorce.
FACTS
Appellant Rosalind Ann Johnson Wiiley
and appellee Glen Paul Wiiley were married
on April 29, 19S2. The parties had no children together, and both had been married
oreviously. Mrs. Wiiley had custody of three
children from her former marriage who, at
the time of the Willeys' divorce, were twenty,
seventeen, and thirteen years old.
During the marriage, Mr. Wiiley worked
as a stockbroker, receiving commissions instead of regular wages. Since 19S5, Mr.
Wtlley's annual income ranged from a high of
$133,052 in 19S7, to a low of 573,095 in 19S9.
In addition, Mr. Wiiley earned deferred bonuses in 19S7 (approximately S14.2CO), 1990
(approximately $11,000) and 1991 (projected
at' $16,219), payable in 1992. 1995 and 1996,
respectively, as long is he remained employed by the same firm.
At the time of their marriage, Mrs. Wiiley
was employed full-time in retail clothing
sales and earned approximately $I0,CCO annually. Alter the marriage, Mrs. Wiiley
worked sporadically part-time. r.*r income
ranged from a high of S6ST1 in 19S5 to
nothing in 19S9. In 1990, she earned gross
wages of $4-112. working for five dollars an
hour as a part-time salesperson in a bookstore and occasionally leading literary discussion groups formed through the bookstore.
Mrs. Wiiley also received S332 per month in
child suaaort frora her ftrct hvishaad.
To finance their lifestyle, the parties liquidated assets and incurred debts. Ntrs. Willey owned a home a: the time of her marriage to Mr. Wiiley. The parties sold this
home in 19S3, using the $29,164 in equity to
purchase and improve a new home in their
joint names. In 1935, the paries sold their
joint home and purchased the home in which
they lived at the time of their divorce. At
the time of trial, they owed S232.CC0 to Zions
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Bank on the -Irs; mortgage on :he marital
horae. l?> idc&Q?., Cr.e, oarie$ hid to?.s<3:.>
dated loans from Mrs. Wilie/s parents i.r.o
an approxima:eiy $50,000 second mortgage
on the home.
The parties separated in November o:
1990. In February of 1991, they reached a
stipulation regarding temporary support.
Under the agreement, Mr. Wiiley mace most
of the payments on the marital debts, inducing the $2492 monthly payment to Zions
Bank on the first mortgage for their home
and an approximately $360 monthly payment
against a Firs: Interstate Bank line of credit
(the First Interstate debt). He also paid
$1500 in monthly support to Mrs. Wiiley.
The monthly payments for the second mortgage were deferred temporarily by agreement. Mrs. Wiiley remained in possession of
the marital home.
After a two-day trial, the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law
and a final decree of divorce. We review the
court's decision only as it affects the issues
on appeal.
The court ordered each party to assume
one-half of the approximately $!2.CCO Firs:
Interstate debt. The court denied >Lrs. Wiiley's claim that she should receive $29.15-4
from the sale of her premarital home as
premarital property, nnding tha: :'r.»$» proceeds had lost their separate identity. The
court awarded Mrs. Wiiley $.5000 of her documented $19,215 in attorney (as. Furthermore, the court set alimony for Mrs. Wiiley
at $1500 a month for one year to be reduced
to $1000 a month for the next three years
and then to terminate. Relevant to that
award, the court found that Mrs. Wiiley
could earn $1500 to $2000 monthly and that
Mr. Wiiley earned an average of SilO.C-CO
annually, or approximately $90£0 a month.
In addition, the court ordered the marital
home to be listed at $350,000 and sold as
soon as possible. Tne court ordered the sale
proceeds to be used to retire both mortgages
on the home and cover the costs of sale.
Any remaining proceeds were to go to Mrs.
Wiiley if the home sold within ninety days
after trial. If the home sold after ninety
days, the courw ordered the panies to &.id>
equally any loss or gain. At oral argument,
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the parties agreed :he home sold for a loss,
resulting lr. a debt c: approximately $37,000.
On appeal, Mrs. Willey argues che cour.
abused its discretion in: (i) se::ing che alimony award; (2) ordering her to be responsible for one-half of che marital debts; (3)
failing co recognize her premarital equity in
the marital home; and (4) failing to award
her a. significant contribution coward her
claimed attorney (as of $19,215. In addition, Mrs. Willey requests attorney izes on
appeal.
I.

ALIMONT AND PROPERTY
DIVISION

Mrs. Willey contends the trial court
abused its discretion in setting the alimony
award. She claims the court failed to make
sufficient findings regarding either parvus
financial need, ignored both her actual needs
and her ability to support herself, and erroneously imputed 31500 to S2C-CO a month to
her as income. Because the trial court failed
to make sufficient findings regarding the
parties' needs and resources, we reverse and
remand for a redetermination of the amount
of the alimony award and the entry of findings necessary to support the revised award.
A.

Legal Standard

[I] We will not overturn a trial court's
alimony ruling as long as the court supports
its ruling with adequate findings and exercises its discretion according to the standards
we have set. Bell v. Bell, SIO ?.2d 439, 491
(Utah App.l99i). In Belt, this court reiterated the well-settled standard for alimony set
forth by the Utah Supreme Court in Jones v.
/ o w j / l C O P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 19S5),
which stated:
"(T)he most important function of alimony
is to provide support for the (spouse) as
nearly as possible at the standard of living
she (or he) enjoyed during the marriage,
and to prevent the (spouse) from becoming
a public charge." English v. English, 565
P.2d (409) at 411 ((Utah 1977))....
(T)hree factors . . . must be considered in
fixing a reasonable alimony award:
(1) the financial conditions and mzds
of che (spouse seeking support);

(2) che ability of the (sp
support] to produce a su:.
for (himself or] herself; z
(3) the ability of the (pa\
provide support.
Jones, 7CO ?.2d at 1075.
(2] "Failure to consider the
in fashioning an alimony awar
an abuse of discretion." Bell, S
(citations omitted). Thus, "th
must make sufficiently detaile
each factor to enable a revie*
ensure that the tr.ai court's
determination was rationally ba
three Jones factors. Id. (citat
"If sufficient findings are not rr
reverse unless the record is cie
troverted such as co allow us
Jones factors as a matter of la
Id. (citation omitted).
B. Trial Court Fine
In its findings of fact and
law on alimony, the trial cour
The court finds that a re:
age income to use for plainti.
ing alimony to be paid in
SI 10,003. Because of plair
ment as a stock broker, h
fluctuated. In 19S7 and 199
unusually good income year
further finds that defendant
earning an income of betwe
$2,000 per month, based on
and qualifications. Accordir
finds that it is equitable tha
alimony to defendant of Sl,^
for one year from the date
and $1,000 per month for
thereafter. Tne court furt
plaintiff has been support
during the parties' separati
mately one year, and it is
take that time period into ac
mining the term of alimony,
terminate at the end of four
date of trial, or when defenc
cohabits with a member o
sex, or dies, whichever firs
(3) In setting the aiimor
court made no findings on M
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ncial need as the rlrst Jomes faccor reiViile^3 r " inandai n S 5 d ' w W c h u n d e r l >™S r*ac"
il'deterrninacion is required for an assessl of the third Jones factor, the ability of
'a oavor spouse to provide support.1
We have previously reversed an alimony
ivard in a similar case when the trial court
'ailed to address the parties' financial needs.
[n 8M * 5^/4 810 P.2d 4S9 (Utah App.1991),
because the parties "dissipated and lived on
dit," the trial court did not give "much
u-ateht . . . as to what the needs and abilities
of"the parties might be." Id. at 49*2. Thus,
ch* trial court failed to determine the reasonableness of the expenses each party claimed.
This court reasoned that "(w)ithout a finding
on reasonable expenses, we are unable to
determine the true needs of Wife, or to determine Husband's actual ability to pay and,
therefore, to balance Wife's needs against
Husband's ability to pay as required in
Jones." Id. at 493.
We face the identical problem here. At
trial, both parties testified about their financial needs. Mr. Willey claimed monthly excesses totalling $3623, including $350 for re'payment of the First Interstate debt, but
excluding mortgage payments and expenses
for the marital home. Mrs. Willey countered
that his expenses were approximately 52400
because they should exclude attorney fees,
credit card repayments, and the $360 First
Interstate debt repayment. On the first day
of trial, Mrs. Willey claimed expenses of
$5905, including payment of the first mortgage on the marital home. Alternatively, she
claimed expenses of $o40o, which excluded
the mortgage payment but included rent.
On the second day of trial, Mrs. Willey presented revised expense figures of $4754 for
herself and her children, or alternatively,
$2573 for herself alone. The court made no
findings on which, U any, of the expenses
claimed by the parties were appropriate.
1. The trial court should consider a payor
spouse's reasonable needs when determining that
spouse's ability to provide support to a former
spouse: in short, the payor spouse's reasonable
needs are a necessary subsidiary step in deter*
mining the ability to provide support. S<r* 3c'<er
v. Bakdr. 366 P.*2d 540, 5-*7 (Utah A?p.(993).
2. Arguing Mr. Willey incurred most of the First
Interstate debt after separation. Mrs. Willey chal-

Thus, as in 3zlL we remand for findings on
each party's reasonable needs so we can
deurrnine L* che court abused its discretion
in setting che amount and duration of the
alimony award. See id at 493.
Because several issues raised on appeal
are relevant to the Jones alimony analysis,
we reach chem to aid the trial court on
remand.
C. Division of Debt as it Affects
Alimony Award
(4] The trial court made no findings that
would enable us to conclude it considered
either the impact of its division of the Firs:
Interstate debt or the probable result of the
sale of the marital home in assessing the
parties' respective needs.
Regarding the First Interstate debt, Mrs.
Willey argues that distribution of one-half of
the debt to her was inequitable, given her
resources and the disparity in the parties'
income. She argues this Is especially true in
light of the court's alimony award. She correctly notes that Mr. Willey conceded that
she would be incapable of assuming a portion
of this debt, and that he agreed to pay the
full amount We vacate the court's allocation of the First Interstate debt to allow the
court to reconsider its assignment when establishing the appropriate amount of alimony. If the trial court determines that Mrs.
Willey is still obligated to pay a portion of
the debt, the court should factor in her share
of the debt payment when calculating the
alimony award. The court may, of course.
reallocate the debt if it deems that appropriate.
In order to effectuate repayment of the
two mortgages, the trial court ordered:
The house should be sold as soon as feasible because it constitutes a substantial financial burden on the parties. The house
lenges the trial court's finding that it was incurred for family expenses. However. Mrs. Wii.
ley haj fai!:d to marshal the evidence in supper,
of the trial court's finding and then show *hy
this evidsr.Cf is insufficient to support that finding. Set C:ah R.Civ.?. 52(a). Thus, we accept
the court's finding.
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should be listed at $350,000 with a new real
estate agent to be agreed upon by che
parties as soon as che present listing
agreement expires. Upon sale of the
house, the first mortgage in :he approximate amount of 3232.000 to Zion's Bank
should be paid in full, and :he second
mortgage in the approxima:e amount of
$30,000 to Beverly Johnson should be paid
in full, together with all costs of sale. Any
net proceeds of the sale then remaining
should be divided as follows:
(a) If the house is sold within 90 days of
the dace of November 22. 1991, ail remaining net proceeds of sale should be
awarded to defendant.
(b) If the house is sold after the expiration of 90 days from November 22. 1991,
the parties should divide any net proceeds equally.
(c) In the event that the sales price of
the house is not sufficient co pay the
first and second mortgages and costs of
sale, the parties shall be equally responsible for payment of any short fail or
deficiency.
(5) Although it set a listing price, the
court did not include any specific finding
regarding che value of the home.1 At oral
argument on appeal, counsel for both parties
agreed that the sale incurred a debt of approximaceiy $37,000. Again, we conclude the
trial court should consider this debt when it
reexamines the alimony award on remand,
because this debt has a direct bearing on all
three of the Jones criteria. Set B\irt v. Burt,
799 P.2d 1155, 1172 (Utah App.1990).1
D.

Mrs. Valley's Financial Obligation
to K*r Children by a Previous
Marriage

Mrs. Willey also contends the court misapprehended her financial situation because it
3. The trial court could have taken evidence on
ind mace a specific finding regarding the value
o: the home. If that valuation was proven incorrect after the sale, either party could have peti«
tioned the court cor a codification based on a
change o: circumstance*. Following this proce*
d\itc would allow the court to maxe an informed
decision based on the best data available.
«*. As a side argument regarding the debt on the
marital home. Mrs. Wiltey argues that a portion
oc the money borrowed from r.t: parents. se«

rerusec co consreer evicer.ee cc
obligation co her children in c:
alimony award. The extent to •.
viduai's n^zds and ability co su
or herself are affected by chat *
obligation to support children
marriage is an issue Utah's ap:
have not directly considered.
We note, however, the Utah U
imposed a duty of support or
only during the duration of c
Utah law expressly provides th
ent's obligation to support a su
nates upon divorce.
A stepparent shall support
the same extent that a natur:
parent is required to support
vided, however, that upon th
of the marriage or common
ship between the stepparchild's natural or adoptive pa
port obligation shall termina
Utah Code Ann. § 7S-45-U (
(6) Mr. Wille/s former step
penses should not be considered
Mrs. Willey alimony. The c
penses are properly addresse
Uniform Civil Liability for Sup?
Code Ann. §§ TS—15—I throug
As calculated from the inconu
dren's parents (not former see:
guidelines presumptively cover
living expenses, including basi
Ckrisiic7isen v. Christicnsziu
593 (Utah 19S3).
(7] The children's father,
previous husband, is paving ch
quired under the guidelines,
stances have changed since the
calculated. Mrs. Willey can see*
cured by a trust deed against the h
for the purchase of the couple's .xShe contends the trial court sr
have made Mr. Willey tr.dtvidua
for the second mortgage. Ss'e c
court abused iti discretion in div
However, on remand, i; che coallocate a portion of this marita
Willey. that decision must be cor
ting the alimony award.
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of the support order. She should not, however, te *kte ^ -viviixs. M.r. WIU7 \^ V.^.p
support c^2 c—^-r2n through an alimony
award. See, t.g, Sckerv. 3aJ<er, S65 ?.2d at
546 (considering expenses of grandchildren
living with spouse receiving alimony "would
be tantamount to giving a child support
award for the grandchildren"); see also Needel v. XeedeL 15 Ariz.App. 471, 4S9 ?.2d 729,
732 (1971) (rejecting attempt to introduce
testimony about expenses of children from
prior marriage); Braidel v. BrsnctL 555
So.2d 1259, 1273 (Miss. 1990) (disallowing portion of alimony that would have gone to
expenses of child by former spouse); Shribtier v. Skribwr, 153 N.J.Super. 374, 379 A.2d
1044, 1045 (CLCh.Div.1977) (holding wife
"should not be permitted to obtain through
the back door what she cannot obtain direct-

B% tcwautatiQa of lacQrtve to Mr*. WilUy
(3) Mrs. Willey contends the court improperly imputed to her a monthly income of
$1500 to $2000 in setting her alimony award.
She argues that the court's finding is based
sotely upon speculation. We agree.
At trial, Mr. Willey called Mrs. Wiley's
current employer, who testified that if Mrs.
Willey were employed full-time in the same
position, she would make $300 per month
gross income, but that no full-time sales or
managerial positions were available for Mrs.
Willey. Mrs. Willey called the director of
human resources from a large Utah company
to testify. This expert testified that a fortytwo-year-old woman with an outdated bachelor of arts degree, without marketable s'tdlls,
and who had not bzzn employed full-time for
ten years, needed at least three years of
education to upgrade her skills, unless she is
Xohe re\ega:ed 10 an unskilled sales or similar position. Tne trial court rejected this
witness's testimony, finding it not credible in
light of the witness's prior relationship with
Mrs. V/illey and the fact that she was planning to charge Mrs. Willey $liCO for her
services. Mrs. Willey testified that to earn a
teacher's starJr.g salary of $1333 to $1500 a
5. The:: 1$ r.o svidsnce that Mrs. Willsy had any
foundation on uhtch to hue her es::.T.a:5 of a
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ponth.5 she would need to complete :hir:yv^V& •&forv>V.<t>sirb <&< ^ vvrv^Cv;* VAM: *i?i«
versity program, which could be done in one
year only if sh^ attended school full-time.
She also testified chat a teacher's salary was
not enough income for her to live on and thus
she hoped to pursue other avenues of employment.
Regarding NLrs. Wiiley's ability to earn
income, the trial court stated:
The court finds that the defendant is
capable of earning income substantially in
excess of that which is proposed here.
Her earnings projection are ac the level of
SS60.00. While there is not testimony of
her having actively sought other income
she described herself as a hobbyist. The
court finds that she has previously worked
in sales, in retail sales and clothing, that
she works in a bookstore in sales, that she
conducts classes . . . with interested persons, and those yie'ld gTeater income. Tne
court believes that it would not be unreasonable to expect that her income could or
should be in the range of $1,500 to $2,000
per month based upon her education and
her circumstances. I recognize that there
may be a little bit of time necessary co get
to that level, that starting a job takes a
little time at a lower rate, but it should not
be below SS60.00 and should certainly be
within that level within 12 to 24 months.
We cannot say the trial court abused its
discretion in setting Mrs. Wiiley's earnings at
SS50 per month based on a projection of fulltime work at her present salary'- See Thronson v. Thrmson. S10 P.2d 423, 435 (Utah
Ap?.). cert denied S26 P.2d 651 (Utah 1991).
However, there is no basis for the trial
court's finding that Mrs. Willey could earn
$1500 to S2000 per month within a year or
two. %Vehave previously he\d such a finding
improper. In Sell v. BelL S10 ?.2d 439
(Utah App.1991). the trial court imputed a
$1500 income to Mrs. Bell, despite undisputed testimony that she earned SS53 p^r month
as a part-time teaching assistant at Utah
State University. t± at 492 n. 2. The imputed income was based on the level i^i had
:each:r's ssar.in; salary.
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previously earned as a full-time sch:-:'. ceacher in another sate, appropriately r-o years
before she filed for divorce from he: husband
of cen years, id We no:ed cha; M(.-.]o explanation was offered for this unusual (Ir.come)
adjustment" 1<L
Mrs. Willey^ circumstances are similar to
Mrs. Bell's. Like Mrs. Bell, who began
working part-time two years prior :O filing
for divorce, Mrs. Willey worked pan-time
during her marriage. Both possessed college
degrees. However, unlike Mrs. Sell, Mrs.
Willey never utilized her cwenty-year-oid education degree in an employment capacity.
In Mrs. Bell's case, the trial cour. imputed
an income she had actually earned on a fulltime basis three years before trial. However, for Mrs. Willey, the trial cour. first imputed an income based on full-time employment at her current wage ($S60 per month),
and then, without any factual basis, speculated that she could raise her income :o $1500
to $2000 per month.
The only evidence presented to suggest
that she could earn income greater than $S60
per month came from Mrs. Willey herself
and from the witness whose testimony the
court found not credible. If the tr.al coun
relied on Mrs. WiHe/s testimony, it appears
the court failed to take into account her
statement that she could earn $1333 ;o $1500
monthly as a starting teacher only ir.er attending school for one year on a full-time
basis, and then only if jobs were available.
Funhermore, she had never taught school
before, and there was no historical record of
other earnings on which to base this rinding.
We do not question the trial coun's authority to impute income to Mrs. 'Willey.
Imputing income to an unemployed or underemployed spouse when setting an alimony
award is conceptually appropriate as part of
the determination of that spouse's ability to
produce a sufficient income. See Bell, 810
P.2d at 491-92. However, it cannot be premised upon mere conjecture; instead, it demands a careful and precise assessment requiring detailed findings. We have examined
imputation in other contexts and outlined a
detailed approach that, while not expressly
applicable to the instant situation, should inform the trial court's assessment uson re-

mand. See, eg, nail v. Hal
Adv.Rep. 29 (Utah App.1993) (L
statutory guidelines and arJcui
sary findings for imputation o
parents in determining child 5
gations); State v. Vincent S^
(Utah App.1992) (describing fin
King assessments of earning c
other financial factors in deter
gency for appointment of couns
Such findings, however, are nc
from the record before us. With
are unable to see how the trial c
ed income level follows from or
by the evidence. Based on the
record, we conclude that the
jump to the higher salary ra
abuse of discretion. See Rasbi
band, 752 P.2d 1331 (Utah Ap
remand, the trial court may ba~
on Mrs. Wille/s $360 per mdn
earnings or, should it wish to usincome figure, hold funher evid-.
ings to receive evidence on ^
future earning capacity consist
cases cited above.
F.

Rehabilitative Alim

[9,10] It is clear from the
the alimony award that it was
achieve a rehabilitative purpost
no difficulty with a properly fas
bilitative award under the facts
However, to the extent the alim*
incended to be rehabilitative. iL
close the gap between actual e
actual income to enable the rect
to then be better able to suppor
herself when the alimony and sc
Bell v. Bell SiO P.2d 4S9. 492-9
App.1991). Thus, the coun rr.iz
istic assessments of actual cur
and actual expenses. The cou:
consider the time demands and
attending school. Absent sucr
ment and appropriate findings.
basis on which to determine
amount and duration of alimon
achieve a rehabilitative outconv
C.

Summary

A thorough review of the re
that the court made no findim
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either pare/5 reasonable financial needs,
/r^a court also failed to adjust eicher party's
gaancial needs to account for the debt payments each would owe to Firs: Interstate
after the court's property distribution. Fur^ e r # the trial court did not incorporate the
contemplated debt arising from the sale of
•ke marital home in the alimony determination. However, the court did not err in
excluding evidence of the impact of Mrs.
\V"die/s obligation to support her children
from her previous marriage irr assessing the
aopropriate alimony award. Finally, the
court imputed income to Mrs. Volley that is
unsupported by the record. Given the record before us, we are simply unable to balance Mrs. Wille/s need and her ability to
support herself against Mr. Wille/s ability to
oay as required by Jones; consequently, we
cannot determine whether the trial court
abused its discretion in setting the amount
and duration of the alimony award. We
therefore reverse and remand the alimony
award for additional findings on each of the
Jones factors and a reassessment of the alimony award in light of those findings and our
decision.
II. PREMARITAL EQUITY
(11) Mrs. Willey next contends the trial
court abused its discretion by failing to recognize her equity in the marital home derived from proceeds of the sale of her premarital home. Mr. Willey responds that the
evidence supports the trial court's finding
chat Mrs. Wille/s premarital equity has lost
its separate character as premarital property. We affirm the trial court's ruling on the
basis that any premarital equity was consumed during the marriage.
"Generally, the rule for premarital property is that each party retain the separate
property he or she brought into the marriage." Dunn v. Duiin, S02 P.2d 1314, 1321
(Utah App.1990). However, if the "property
has been consumed or its identity lost
through commingling or exchanges'* it no
longer falls within the rule. Mortensen v.
Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304, 303 (Utah 193S)
(emphasis added).
Although the trial court found the funds
had lost their identity through commingling,

the evidence shows that they were actually
consumed, i.e., the equity was used for various expenses during the course of the marriage. Therefore, we affirm the court's rejection of Mrs. Wille/s claim on that basis.
III.

ATTORNEY FEES

A.

Fees Through Trial

[12,13] Mrs. Willey maintains tha; the
trial court abused its discretion in awarding
her only SoOCO in attorney fees when she
submitted evidence supporting her claim for
$19,215. A trial court may award attorney
ta^s in divorce proceedings. Utah Code Ann.
§ 30-3-3 (Supp.1993). 'The award must be
based on evidence of the financial need of the
receiving spouse, the ability of the other
spouse to pay, and the reasonableness of the
requested ie>ts.n Bell v. Bell 810 P.2d 439,
493 (Utah App.1991). 'The decision to make
such an award and the amount thereof rest
primarily in the sound discretion of the trial
court" fd However, "(t]o permit meaningful review of the trial court's discretionary
ruling, *(w]e have consistently encouraged
trial courts to make findings to explain the
factors which they considered relevant in
arriving at an attorney fee award.'" Id. at
494 (quoting Regional Sales Agenrj, Inc. v.
Reickert, 7S4 P.2d 1210, 1215 (Utah App.
19S9)).
A court may consider, among other factors,
the difficulty of the litigation, the efficiency
of the attorneys, the reasonableness of the
number of hours spent on the case, the fee
customarily charged in the locality, the
amount involved in the case and the result
attained, and the expertise and experience
of the attorneys involved.
Id 810 P.2d at 493-94. .
[14] Mrs. Willey testified that she
thought her attorney fees were reasonable.
Counsel for Mrs. Willey made a proffer at
trial concerning his $19,215 bill for legal services and testified that he had spent 123.1
hours on the case. Counsel's documented
time was billed at $150 per hour. Counsel
for Mr. Willey challenged the reasonableness
of opposing counsel's expenses, activities, and
billing rats. However, the trial court did not
indeoendentlv assess either this testimony or
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othenv.se affirm.
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The Court of Appeals. C
that: (I) exigent circumst
warranting warrantless zc
cers had probable cause
fencan; had placed dm^s
(3) remand was required :
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ELLEN MAYCOCK-2131
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK
A Professional Corporation
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Eighth Floor, Valley Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801)531-7090
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

GLEN P. WILLEY
Plaintiff,

)

vs.

]

ROSALIND ANN JOHNSON WILLEY

]

Defendant.

ORDER

]

]i

Civil No. 91 490 0101
Judge David S. Young

Plaintiffs and defendant's objections to the commissioner's recommendation
came before the court for hearing on March 5,1993, pursuant to notice. Plaintiff was
present and represented by his counsel, Ellen Maycock, and defendant was present
and represented by her counsel, Roger D. Sandack. The Honorable David S. Young
presided. The court having reviewed the file herein and heard the arguments of
counsel, and good cause appearing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:
1.

Plaintiffs objection to the commissioner's recommendation is granted.

2.

Plaintiff is awarded a judgment against defendant in the amount of

$18,840.86 and may offset against that amount the alimony he would otherwise be
required to pay to defendant.
3.

Plaintiff shall pay $500 in alimony to defendant for March and may offset

the remaining $500 that would otherwise be part of his March alimony obligation
against the judgment.
4.

Plaintiff presently has in his possession tax refund checks from the United

States in the amount of $1,132 and the State of Utah in the amount of $639.
Defendant's share of those tax refund checks should also be offset against the
judgment, and defendant should be ordered to endorse the checks so that can be
accomplished.
5.

Defendant's objection to the commissioner's recommendation is denied.

DATED this ^

davofMftfcfel993.

BY THE COURT:
/
//'

A'/
JUDGE DAVID S. YOUNG
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER to
the following, postage prepaid, this 5th day of March, 1993:
Roger D. Sandack, Esq.
500 Kearns Building
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
r -*
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ELLEN MAYCOCK - 2131
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK, L.L.C
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Eighth Floor, Bank One Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2034
Telephone: (801)531-7090

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
GLENP.WILLEY,

)

Plaintiff,

)

vs.

)

ROSALIND ANN JOHNSON WILLEY,

)

Defendant.

)

PRETRIAL ORDER

Civil No. 91 490 0101 DA
Judge David S. Young
Commissioner Michael S. Evans

The decree of divorce was entered by this court in this matter on January, 14, 1992.
Defendant appealed the final divorce decree entered by this court to the Utah Court of Appeals,
and the Court of Appeals remanded to this court on November 29, 1993, for further findings on
three issues:
a.

The award of alimony;

b.

The allocation of certain debts; and

c.

Defendant's attorney's fees.

Specifically, this court was directed to make additional findings on the following:
a.

The financial needs of both parties;

b.

The reasonableness of each party's expenses;
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ELLEN MAYCOCK - 2131
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK, L.L.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Eighth Floor, Bank One Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2034
Telephone: (801)531-7090

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
GLEN P. WILLEY,

;

Plaintiff,

])

vs.

t

ROSALIND ANN JOHNSON WILLEY,

1
]

Defendant.

1
]

PRETRIAL ORDER

Civil No. 91 490 0101 DA
Judge David S. Young
Commissioner Michael S. Evans

The decree of divorce was entered by this court in this matter on January, 14, 1992.
Defendant appealed the final divorce decree entered by this court to the Utah Court of Appeals,
and the Court of Appeals remanded to this court on November 29, 1993, for further findings on
three issues:
a.

The award of alimony;

b.

The allocation of certain debts; and

c.

Defendant's attorney's fees.

Specifically, this court was directed to make additional findings on the following:
a.

The financial needs of both parties;

b.

The reasonableness of each party's expenses;
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(iii)
e.

Plaintiff,

Defendant will call the following witnesses:
(i)

The parties;

(ii)

Defendant's attorney;

(iii)

Rebuttal vocational expert, if necessary; and

(iv)

Roxanne Hanson.

DATED this fo^day of October, 1994.
BY THE COURT:

KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK, L.L.C.
Eighth Floor, Bank One Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

ELLEN MAYCOCK"
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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(iii)
e.

Plaintiff.

Defendant will call the following witnesses:
(i)

The parties;

(ii)

Defendant's attorney;

(iii)

Rebuttal vocational expert, if necessary; and

(iv)

Roxanne Hanson.

Dthis jS^fday of October, 1994.
BY THE COURT:

J U D G E D S ^ ^
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK, L.L.C.
Eighth Floor, Bank One Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

By_

Y ^ N T ^ ^

^J^lF^ '
~^*

W-Jkf»£—
ELLEN MAYCOCK
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

GLEN P. WILLEY,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
CASE NO. 914900101

Plaintiff,

*>/,

fy^e*
K*»
^

vs.
ROSALIND ANN JOHNSON WILLEY,
Defendant.

The above-entitled matter came on for hearing after remand
from the Court of Appeals the 17th day of November, 1994, pursuant
to Notice.

The plaintiff was present and represented by his

attorney Ellen Maycock, the defendant was present and represented
by her attorney Roger D. Sandack.
On remand from the Utah Court of Appeals, (Willey v. Willey,
866 P2d 547 [Utah App. 1993]) the trial court was asked to make
findings with respect to the following:
1.

The reasonable financial needs of the parties.

2.

The division of the parties' debt as it affects the award

of alimony.
3.

The imputation of income to the defendant.

4.

The

ability

of each party

to pay

the defendant's

attorney's fees.
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5.

The reasonableness of those fees.

A Brief History of the Case
The Parties separated in November of 1990 and the Plaintiff
(husband) filed for divorce January 8, 1991. Both parties had
been previously married and the defendant had children who were
supported, in part, by the plaintiff during the marriage.

The

parties were married to each other on the 29th of April, 1982.
No children were born as issue of this marriage.

The parties at

the time of separation had lived together for eight and one-half
years.

The original case was tried November 21-22, 1991.

Decree of Divorce was entered January 14, 1992.
appealed the Trial Court's decision.

The

The defendant

The Court of Appeals

"reverse(d) and remand(ed) the court's rulings on alimony and the
award of attorney fees" and also requested the trial court to
"reconsider" the division of property as it would effect the
issues of alimony and fees.

The Appeals Court remanded the case

for the entry of findings on "...(1) the award of alimony, (2)
the allocation of debt, and (3) the award of attorneys fees at
trial and on appeal."

The case was "otherwise affirm(ed.)"

This court asked Counsel to list the issues they thought
should be reviewed and they provided five (5) areas as discussed
hereafter.
2
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Facts and Ruling on Remand

1.

The reasonable financial needs of the parties.

Defendant submitted exhibit 3 6-D as a summary of both
parties' monthly expenses.

The court finds that the parties'

reasonable monthly expenditures are as stated hereafter.

ITEM

G. PAUL WILLEY

ROSALIND WILLEY

Rent

$610.00

$610.00

Food

246.83

246.83

Auto Insurance...

83.00

83.00

Apartment Ins....

7.50

7.50

Incidentals

200.00

200.00

Dry Cleaning

21.00

21.00

Auto payments....

793.00

381.83

Gas & Maint

163.37

163.37

Utilities

40.00

40.00

Telephone

48.30

40.45

Entertainment....

75.00

75.00

-0-

660.00

Unreimbursed med/dent.
Counseling

60.00

60.00

Newspaper & Sub..

19.43

19.43

-0-

30.00

Pet Care

000984

Housecleaning....

40.00

TOTALS

$2,4 63.16

40 . 00
$2,678.41

The figures above were initially prepared by and presented
by the Plaintiff.

Thereafter the defendant simply adopted the

plaintiff's expenses as hers with minor adjustments.

This method

is not to be preferred as it does not require the defendant to
critically analyze her reasonable expenses and present them to
the court.

However, under the circumstances, the court has no

other choice than to accept them with the following comment.
The court finds these expenses to be "reasonable" but notes
that both parties have high automobile expenses and the
defendant's medical expenses surely must not be a monthly ongoing
amount of $660.00 per month.

The record shows the defendant had

major surgery in the fall of 1991 but nothing is reflected as to
why the ongoing expenses would continue on a monthly basis.
The court concludes that each party, in order to maintain a
standard of living consistent with both the expectations during
marriage and the financial circumstances of the parties should
incur reasonable monthly living expenses of $2,000.00. This
number is arrived at for the defendant by reducing the monthly
medical bills to $60.00 and reducing the automobile expense by
$80.00 per month.

The plaintiff's automobile expenses can be

similarly adjusted down to reach the figure of $2,000.00 per
4
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month for him.

2.

Division of the parties debts as it affects the award of

alimony.
The focus of the review of debts was to be to examine how
payment of those debts would affect the ability of the Plaintiff
to render alimony and of the defendant to earn sufficient income
to pay a share of the debts.
At the time of the divorce (though the parties lived
otherwise due to expenditures beyond their income and beyond
their cash flow) the parties had virtually no net worth.

The

home was represented at trial as an asset with a presumed equity.
This was not found to be true through the experience of sale.
The parties, after separation needed to sell the home.

While the

defendant states that she was interested in the speedy sale of
the home, the record seems to belie that assertion.
On July 17, 1992 Presiding Judge Michael Murphy held an
emergency hearing regarding the sale of the home.

The Judge

concluded that the home was listed too high at $350,000.00.
After hearing the testimony of Ms. Sue Christensen of The Ramsey
Group Judge Murphy concluded that, "...the parties could not
reasonably expect to receive a gross sales price greater than
$330,000.00 and the house may sell for $300,000.00."
5
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Due to the conflicts between the parties in arriving at an
agreed sales price, Judge Murphy ordered, "Ms. Christensen is
authorized to accept a price as low as $300,000.00 if, in her
discretion and judgment, that is the best price she reasonably
believes she can currently obtain for the house.11
At the time of trial in November of 1991, the home had a
first mortgage of approximately $232,000.00 and a second mortgage
of approximately $80,000.00.

During the period of separation,

the amount paid on the second mortgage, which was owed to the
defendant's mother, was not able to be paid to her but was paid
instead in temporary support to the defendant.

The unpaid amount

continued to accrue interest and was paid to the defendant's
mother upon sale of the home.
The parties now acknowledge that the home sold October 5,
1992.

After paying the mortgages and the costs of sale, a

deficiency on the home remained in the amount of $28,113.71 of
which, due to the date of sale and the language of the Decree of
Divorce, each party was obligated for $14,056.86.

The plaintiff

has paid the entire amount.
In addition to the deficiency on the home there remained a
credit line to First Interstate Bank.

Each party was obligated

to pay one-half of the balance of $9,568.00.

The entire amount

was liquidated by the plaintiff requiring him to pay $4,784.00
6
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for the defendant.
At this time, the plaintiff has paid on the defendant's
behalf, $14,056.86 for the mortgage deficiency and $4,784.00 for
the First Interstate Bank balance.
$18,84 0.86.

It is the court's further understanding that no

marital debts remain unpaid.
all.

These combined amount to

The plaintiff has satisfied them

During the entire period of separation, the plaintiff paid

the monthly mortgage payments of $2,485.55 which for some 11
months until sale amounted to $27,341.05.

All of that amount was

lost (except for the interest expense benefit) in the sale which
resulted the deficiency of $28,113.71.
Substantial sums have now been paid by the plaintiff to
liquidate the family obligations and the court finds that it is
reasonable to deny any further repayment by the defendant to the
plaintiff.

The defendant is thus awarded $18,840.86 in value.

At the present time, it does not appear that the division of
debts has a continuing bearing on the issue of alimony.

3.

The imputation of income to the defendant.

At the time of trial, the plaintiff was employed as a stock
broker. The Court made findings that his income over the relevant
period of time yielded an average of $110,000 per year.

The

defendant worked part time in a book store.
7
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The defendant, in addition to being a part time book store
salesperson, conducted literature discussion groups for
additional income.

She was paid $5.00 per hour for her work in

sales, and received varying amounts of income, depending upon the
number of persons who attended the discussion groups. The
defendant's employer was unable to employ her "full-time," and
the defendant took no steps during the parties' separation to
obtain alternative employment or to enhance her employability
through education.

Indeed, since the parties separation in 1991

to the present time she remains in the same employment and
without having made any further effort to seek rehabilitative
education in order to enhance her employment skills or
opportunities.
Prior to the parties' marriage, the defendant worked in
retail clothing sales at Nordstroms Department Store.

Shortly

after marriage she terminated her full-time employment and began
to pursue actively her literary interests. This decision caused
great stress in the parties' relationship.

The plaintiff

continually requested that the defendant continue her education,
and/or return to work which she refused to do.
The defendant's income for the years 1982 through 1991 as
contained in defendant's Exhibit 34-D, showed an average annual
income of $4,135.75.

Her income in 1991 was $6,287.00.
8
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At the hearing, Ms. Connie Romboy was called as a career
guidance counselor to provide information as to the employability
of the defendant.
Ms. Romboy's test evaluations indicated that Ms. Willey
enjoys superior learning potential, and ranked in the 95th
percentile, compared to persons of her own age.

She further

found that she was well-adjusted and stable in her personality
factors.

Her scores indicated skills in management, teaching and

social services.

Ms. Romboy testified that Ms. Willey's

vocational barriers were precisely the same now as existed in
November of 1991.

Ms. Romboy's report indicates that had Ms.

Willey chosen to quit her job at the book store and look for
other work, she could have obtained work with her then existing
skills in employment, carrying a low income of $4.25 per hour as
a sales clerk, to a high of $6.17 as a customer service
representative.

The average of the rates suggested is $5.32 per

hour, and over the three intervening years, a 3.5% annual
increase could reasonably have been expected.

Thus, the present

earning capacity of Ms. Willey should be $5.90 per hour, or
$12,325.08 per annum, or $1,027.09 per month.

This earning would

be so if Ms. Willey had not pursued further education which she
did not do.

Ms. Willey is thus imputed to have earnings of

$11,108.16 for 1991; $11,496.95 for 1992; $11,889.34 for 1993;
9
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and, $12,315.82 if working full time.
After trial, the defendant received $1,500 per month alimony
for one year from January 1992 to January 1993.

Thereafter she

received $1,000 per month for three years or until January 1996.
Thus the schedule of monthly income imputed to the defendant
for each of the years in question is as follows:
Year

Earnings

Alimony

Total

1992

$

958.08

$1,500.00

$2,458.08

1993

991.61

1,000.00

1,991.61

1994

1,026.32

1,000.00

2,026.32

1995

1,062.24

1,000.00

2,062.24

Had Ms. Willey pursued her education, she would have
enhanced her earning capacities within one year as a school
teacher, to $6.70 per hour; and, within two years to somewhere
between $9.58 and $12.41 per hour, had she sought education to
become either a marketing expert or social worker.
Ms. Willey expressed no interest in becoming a school
teacher, and since it would not provide as much earning potential
as the other alternatives, the Court would find it reasonable for
her to have anticipated pursuing education for two years in order
to qualify for a higher paying job.

She apparently has chosen

neither educational option to date.
The court thus concludes that, consistent with the testimony
10
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of Ms. Romboy, Ms. Willey's imputed income today should be $5.90
per hour or $12,315.82 per annum.

4.

The ability of each party to pay the marital debts and

the defendant's attorney's fees.
For the purposes of this analysis, the plaintiff at trial
was determined to earn $110,000.00 per year.

The defendant is

imputed to have earnings of $12,315.82 if working full time.
Each party received a lump sum of $6,562.3 9 representing
one-half of the plaintiff's 1992 employment bonus.
Had Ms. Willey pursued her education immediately upon
separation, she could have earned in 1994 as a school teacher
$1,165.80 per month, and in 1995 and thereafter as a marketing
expert or social worker $1,913.13 per month.
The defendant retained all the furniture, furnishings and
fixtures not conveyed on sale, and other incidental personal
property in the way of household supplies, kitchenware, and tools
etc., from the party's home.

These were retained without lien or

encumbrance.
The Plaintiff was awarded eight (8) specifically named items
of personal property of an unknown dollar value.

The court

ignores the value of this division of personal property in
considering either parties ability to pay for the marital debts
11
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or attorney's fees.
At this time, only the plaintiff is able to pay toward
marital debts due to his higher income and the fact that the
defendant has not sought to improve her income through either
efforts in employment or improved education and skills.

5.

The reasonableness of those fees*

The attorney's fees in this case constitute a matter of
considerable concern to the court.

The court is well aware that

a broader discretionary award of reimbursement in fees is allowed
in domestic cases over other civil cases.
Peterson, 818 P2d 1305 [Utah App. 1991])

(see Peterson v.
The policy makes

considerable sense since the trial courts are charged with making
equitable divisions of property when marriages fail and likewise
courts should make equitable assessments of financial
responsibility for payment of attorneys fees.
A great problem is encountered when the fees are greatly out
of proportion to the marital estate and the present and future
financial circumstances of the parties.
In this case, we have a plaintiff with considerable earnings
potential.

We have a defendant with remarkable skills (95th

percentile of her age group) and yet having little history of
employment and apparently little desire to seek to maximize her
12
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earnings potential through education or other training.
In examining the legal work, the court notes that the
District Court's file is now contained in two (2) large volumes.
The docket alone shows entries amounting to seven (7) pages of
docket entries describing pleadings and filing activity; and, in
addition, the parties have been to court or had hearings set
sixteen (16) different times.

This activity includes only the

District Court and not the Court of Appeals.
One may ask if this case contained unusual or particular
issues of law that may not have otherwise been considered at
trial or on appeal?

Throughout the initial proceeding and on

appeal, the defendant argued that the plaintiff had a continuing
obligation to pay support for her children of a prior marriage.
That matter was rejected by the Trial Court and by the Appeals
Court.

The defendant did however, prevail on issues as to the

adequacy of the findings of fact before the trial court.

This

hearing was therefore necessitated on remand.
This court may further consider the "difficulty of the
litigation, the efficiency of the attorneys, the reasonableness
of the number of hours spent on the case, the fee customarily
charged in the locality, the amount involved in the case, the
result attained, and the expertise and experience of the
attorneys involved."

(Bell v. Bell, 810 P2d. 489 at p 493-4)
13
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In applying these factors, the court finds that this case
was not and should not have been particularly difficult.

It was

a relatively routine divorce of a couple with extreme financial
difficulties and disagreements on how to manage their income and
expenses.
The attorneys efficiency in handling the case was not good.
The defendant's attorney requested trial fees of $19,215.00. The
present affidavit shows 240.1 hours at a billing rate of
$150.00 per hour which results in a fee of $36,015.00. I
recognize that for some of the hours in the present affidavit,
defendant's counsel is not requesting payment, however, he is
requesting payment for 101 hours for $15,150.00 with additional
costs of $1,539.38 for a total of $16,689.38. This amount is
presumably in addition to the $5,000.00 paid after the initial
trial.
The reasonableness of the number of hours seems excessive
and beyond a reasonable evaluation of the case.
The rate of $150.00 per hour for the experience of
defendant's counsel is high but within reasonable rates.
The amount involved in the case, considering the marital
estate, can in no wise justify the fees incurred.

The parties

net worth approached zero. The only meaningful asset was the
plaintiff's earning capacity which he had before the marriage and
14
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obviously brought into the marriage.
The result attained leads one to conclude that since the
matter was sent back on appeal for further findings that, in that
respect, the defendant prevailed.

However, the entire financial

condition of the parties cannot justify combined attorneys fees
in excess of $65,000.00 with little or no marital property
remaining.
Thus the court finds the fees are not reasonable and are not
appropriate as a measure of this case.

Ruling at the Conclusion of the Remand
Based upon the forgoing findings, the court rules as
follows:
1.

The reasonable financial need of the parties for

monthly income is $2,000.00 each.
2.

The division of the parties debt is not to be further

reconsidered.

The debt paid by the plaintiff shall remain as

paid and the plaintiff's claim for contribution from the
defendant is barred.

Thus the amount of $18,840.86 shall remain

as now paid and the defendant shall be discharged therefrom.
3.

The imputation of income to the defendant shall remain

in the annual amount of $12,315.82.

Had the defendant pursued

promptly either of the educational directions presented by Ms.
15
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Romboy she would be earning between $16,500 and $23,800.00 at
this time.
4.

The court finds that the ability of the defendant to

pay attorneys fees is minimal.

On that basis, and viewing the

case as it now stands, (rather than as we all wish it were,) the
court orders the plaintiff to pay an additional amount to the
defendant for attorney's fees of $10,000.00.

This combined with

the prior amount shall mean that the plaintiff shall pay to the
defendant the total amount of $15,000.00 toward her attorney's
fees.

The Court feels that this is an equitable amount

considering the incomes of the parties and the other matters
discussed above.

Of course, the Court recognizes that each party

is responsible for the payment of fees incurred independent of
this award.
5.

The court finds the reasonableness of the fees to be

out of line with the true value of the case and with the parties
ability to pay.

This case should have been viewed more

objectively early on and the parties and their attorneys should
not have allowed the case to arrive at this point with combined
attorney's fees in excess of $55,000.00.
6.

One final matter shall be dealt with and that is the

alimony and the concept of "rehabilitative alimony."
The Alimony shall not be increased due to the substantial
16
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payments of marital debt the plaintiff has already paid.
Naturally, it would be better for the defendant to enhance
her skills through obtaining further education.

Even though she

has had opportunities during and after the marriage to do so, she
has not chosen to pursue those opportunities to date.

To assist

her in that respect, should she desire to do so, the court orders
the plaintiff to pay tuition and books for a period of nine (9)
quarters at the University of Utah or some comparable university.
This option must be completed within five (5) years of this date.
While a fully matriculated student, the plaintiff shall pay
$500.00 per month as additional alimony for financial assistance.
Ms. Maycock is requested to prepare findings and an order
consistent herewith and with the record at trial and on remand.
Dated this

3/^aav of January 19 95.^-re

17
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of ,

-2/sr
the foregoing Memorandum Decision, to the following, this

J\

day of January, 1995:
Ellen Maycock
Attorney for Plaintiff
50 W. Broadway, 8th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah
84101-2034
Roger D. Sandack
Attorney for Defendant
170 S. Main, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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ELLEN MAYCOCK - 2131
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK, L.L.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Eighth Floor. Bank One Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 -2034
Telephone: (801)531-7090

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
GLEN P. WILLEY,
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.
ROSALIND ANN JOHNSON WILLEY,
Defendant.

Civil No. 91 490 0101 DA
Judge David S. Young
Commissioner Michael S. Evans

The above-entitled matter came before the court for hearing on November 17, 1994.
pursuant to notice.

The Honorable David S. Young presided.

Plaintiff was present and

represented by his counsel. Ellen Maycock. and defendant was present and represented by her
counsel, Roger D. Sandack.
This matter was before the court on remand from the Utah Court of Appeals. The Court
of Appeals held that additional findings of fact were necessary with respect to the issues of
alimony and attorneys' fees, and specifically directed this court to make such findings on the
following issues:
(i)

the reasonable financial needs of each of the parties;

(ii)

the division of the parties' debt as it affects the award of alimony;
r\
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(iii)

the imputation of income to the defendant;

(iv)

the ability of each party to pay defendant's attorney's fees; and

(v)

the reasonableness of those fees.

The court was also directed to consider the award of attorney's fees on appeal.
The Court of Appeals invited this court to receive additional evidence with respect to the
imputation of income to defendant and the court did hear such evidence. The court having heard
the testimony of witnesses, received exhibits, and reviewed the original record of the trial of this
matter which took place on November 21 and 22, 1991. now makes and enters the following:
Findings of Fact
1.

The parties were married on April 29, 19S2.

2.

Each party has been married previously. Defendant had three children from her

prior marriage.
3.

No children were bom as issue of the marriage.

4.

The parties separated in November 1990, and plaintiff filed for divorce on

January 8, 1991.
5.

A decree of divorce was entered on January 14, 1992.

6.

At the time of trial, defendant was employed part-time in a bookstore as a sales

person and conducting literature discussion groups. She was paid S5.00 per hour for her work as
a sales person and varying amounts for conducting the discussion groups depending upon the
number of persons who attended. Defendant's employer, the owner of the bookstore, testified
that no full-time positions were available. Defendant considered her work at the bookstore a
hobby. Despite these facts, defendant took no steps during the parties' separation to obtain other
employment.

7.

Prior to the marriage of the parties, defendant worked at retail clothing stores and

was able to support herself in that work. At the time of trial, defendant also worked part-time at
a store selling expensive clothing in trade for the clothing she received.
8.

At the time of trial, plaintiff was employed as a stock broker with an average

income of S110.000 per year.
9.

Since the parties' divorce, defendant has taken no steps to become employed full

time or to increase her income through training or education. At the present time, defendant
remains in the same employment at the bookstore and has made no effort to seek rehabilitative
education in order to enhance her employment skills or opportunities to seek other employment.
10.

During the parties' marriage, plaintiff continually requested that defendant

continue her education and/or return to work, which she refused to do.
11.

At the hearing in 1994, Ms. Connie Romboy, a qualified vocational evaluator

employed by the Career Guidance Center, testified concerning the employability of the defendant
and her income earning ability. Ms. Romboy:s test and evaluations indicated that defendant
enjoys superior learning potential and ranked in the ninety-fifth percentile compared to persons
of her own age. She further found that defendant is well-adjusted and stable in her personality
factors. Defendant's scores indicated skills in management, teaching, and social services. Ms.
Romboy's report indicated that, had defendant chosen to quit her job in the bookstore before or
at the time of trial and seek other employment, she could have obtained work with her then
existing skills earning an income between S4.25 per hour as a sales clerk and $6.17 per hour as a
customer service representative. The average of the rates is S5.32 per hour and over the three
intervening years, a 3.5% annual increase could reasonably have been expected. Accordingly,
the court finds that the present earning capacity of defendant should be S5.90 per hour or

SI2.325.08 per annum, or 51,027.09 per month, assuming defendant did not pursue further
education, which she did not.
12.

The court imputes earnings to defendant of $11,108.16 for 1991, SI 1,496.95 for

1992. SI 1,889.34 for 1993, and 512,315.82 for 1994, if working full time.
13.

At trial, defendant was awarded 51,500 per month alimony for one year from

November 1991 to November 1992. Thereafter, she was awarded 51,000 per month for three
years until November 1995. Accordingly, the schedule of monthly income imputed to defendant
for the years in question is as follows:
Year

Earnings

Alimonv

Total

1992

5 958.08

51,500.00

52,458.08

1993

991.61

1,000.00

1,991.61

1994

1,026.32

1,000.00

2,026.32

1995

1,062.24

1,000.00

2,062.24

In addition, plaintiff paid the mortgage payment for the parties' home through October of 1992,
thus decreasing defendant's expenses for that period. In addition, defendant received S6.562.39
as additional alimony in 1992, in that she received one-half of plaintiff s bonus.
14.

Defendant has a bachelor's degree. She could enhance her earning capacities

through obtaining further education, although she has chosen not to pursue those opportunities to
date. For example, according to Ms. Romboy, had defendant pursued her education, she could
have obtained a teaching certificate within one year and enhanced her earning capacities as a
school teacher to 56.70 per hour.

Within two years, she could have enhanced her earning

capacity to somewhere between S9.58 and 512.41 per hour, had she sought education to become
either a marketing expert or social worker.
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15.

So that defendant may continue her education, it is reasonable for plaintiff to pay

the costs of tuition and books for defendant for a period of nine quarters at the University of Utah
or some comparable university, providing such education is completed within five years of
January 31. 1995, to assist defendant in enhancing her earning potential.
16.

Under the present circumstances, the alimony obligation of plaintiff to defendant

should not be increased due in part to the substantial payment of marital debt that plaintiff has
already made. However, if defendant seeks to enhance her skills through obtaining further
education and becomes a fully matriculated student, the court finds that it is reasonable for
plaintiff to pay to defendant S500 per month as additional alimony for financial assistance for a
maximum of nine quarters to be completed within five years following the date of this order.
17.

At trial, plaintiff testified that his monthly expenses were $2,463.16 and defendant

testified that her monthly expenses were S2.678.41.
18.

The court finds plaintiffs automobile expense of S793 per month is unreasonably

high and should be reduced to S329.84 per month.
19.

The court finds that defendant's automobile expense of $381.83 is unreasonably

high and should be reduced to $300 per month.

Also, defendant's monthly unreimbursed

medical/dental expenses of $660 per month are unreasonably high and should be reduced to $60
per month. While the record shows that defendant had major surgery in the fall of 1991, there is
nothing in the record to establish why the ongoing expenses would continue on a monthly basis.
20.

During the marriage, the parties maintained their standard of living by incurring

21.

The court finds that, in order to maintain a reasonable standard of living

debt.

consistent with both the expectations during the marriage and the financial circumstances of the
parties, the reasonable monthly living expenses for each party are S2.000.

r. r
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22.

In addition, from the time of trial in November of 1991 through October of 1992,

plaintiff paid the mortgage payment on the home where defendant was residing. Thus, her
monthly expenses for that time period were reduced by S610 per month. Thus, her monthly
expenses during that time period were SI,400 per month and she received SI,500 per month as
alimony. In addition, the court has imputed income to defendant for 1992 of S958 per month.
23.

The court finds that the alimony paid to defendant and to be paid in the future is

sufficient, together with the income imputed to her, to meet her needs.
24.

The court finds it reasonable that defendant would have anticipated pursuing

education for two years in order to qualify for a higher paying job. If she had done so, she would
now be able to meet her own financial needs.
25.

After the parties' separated, there were not sufficient marital assets to adequately

support the parties and it was necessary for them to sell the marital home.
26.

The home was listed for sale at a selling price of S350,000.

27.

Defendant refused to consider a lower offer to purchase the marital home and an

emergency hearing regarding the sale of the home was held on July 17, 1992, before Judge
Michael R. Murphy because Judge Young was out of town.
28.

Judge Murphy concluded that the home was listed too high at S350,000 and.

based on the testimony of Ms. Sue Christensen of the Ramsey Group, the parties should expect
to sell the house for between S300,000 and 5330,000.
29.

Judge Murphy authorized Ms. Christensen to accept a price as low as S300.000 if

she reasonably believed that was the best price she could obtain for the house.
30.

From the time of separation until the house sold, plaintiff paid the monthly

mongage payments of S2,485.55. The cost to plaintiff was S57,167.65. Plaintiff paid this entire
amount as a loss.

31.

The home sold on October 5, 1992. The proceeds of the sale were not adequate to

pay the outstanding liens and the costs of sale. A deficiency on the home remained in the
amount of S28,l 13.71. Pursuant to the decree of divorce, each party was ordered to pay one-half
of this debt.
32.

Plaintiff paid this entire deficiency amount without reimbursement from

defendant.
33.

As of the time of trial, the parties owed S9,568 to First Interstate Bank. Pursuant

to the decree of divorce, each party was ordered to pay one-half of this debt.
34.

Plaintiff paid the entire debt to First Interstate without reimbursement from

defendant.
35.

Plaintiff paid to defendant one-half of his 1992 employment bonus. She received

S6,562.39.
36.

Defendant was awarded nearly all of the furniture, furnishings, and fixtures not

conveyed on sale, and other incidental personal property in the way of household supplies,
kitchenware. and tools from the parties' home. She received these without lien or encumbrance.
37.

Plaintiff was awarded eight specifically named items of personal property of an

unknown dollar value.
38.

The court finds that the value of the personal property awarded to each party

should not be considered in determining the parties' abilities to pay for the marital debts.
39.

The court finds that based on plaintiffs higher income and the fact that defendant

has not sought to improve her income through efforts to obtain alternate employment or
improved education and skills, defendant is not able to pay toward the marital debts.
40.

Accordingly, the court finds that given the fact that plaintiff has already paid the

marital debts and given the court's findings with respect to alimony and to defendant's
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reasonable needs and ability to earn income, it is reasonable that defendant be awarded the value
of one-half of the amount of marital debts paid by plaintiff in the amount of SI 8.840.86 and that
defendant not be required to repay this amount to plaintiff.
41.

With respect to the issue of the reasonableness of attorneys' fees, the court notes

that the district court's file is contained in two large volumes. There are seven pages of docket
entries describing pleadings and filing activity*. There have been sixteen court appearances in
District Court alone, in addition to the activity in the Court of Appeals.
42.

With respect to unusual or particular issues of law, defendant argued that plaintiff

had a continuing obligation to pay support for her children from a prior marriage. This assertion
was rejected by the trial court and the Court of Appeals.
43.

The most recent hearing was necessitated by defendant's challenging and

prevailing on the adequacy of the findings of fact before the trial court.
44.

In applying the factors to be considered in making an award of attorney's fees, the

court finds that this case was not and should not have been particularly difficult.

It was a

relatively routine divorce of a couple with extreme financial difficulties and disagreements on
how to manage their incomes and expenses.
45.

The court further finds that the efficiency of the attorneys in handling the case was

not good and the reasonableness of the number of hours is excessive and beyond a reasonable
evaluation of the case.
46.

At the time of trial, defendant's attorney requested fees of 519,215.00. The

present affidavit shows 240.1 hours at a billing rate of SI50.00 per hour which results in fees of
S36,015.00.
47.

While defendant's attorney does not request payment for all recorded hours, he

does request payment for 101 hours in the amount of S15.150.00 for fees and costs of $1,539.38

0

V v; J. \j O '1

for a total of SI 6,689.38. This amount is presumably in addition to the S5,000.00 already paid
by plaintiff for defendant's attorney's fees after the trial.
48.

The court finds that the rate of SI50 per hour for the experience of defendant's

counsel is high, but within reasonable range.
49.

However, the amount of attorneys' fees charged in this case, considering the

marital estate, cannot justify the fees incurred. The parties' net worth approached zero and the
only meaningful asset was the plaintiffs earning capacity which he brought into the marriage.
The court finds that the entire financial condition of the parties cannot justify combined
attorneys' fees in excess of $65,000, with little or no marital property remaining. Accordingly,
the court finds the fees are not reasonable.
50.

The ability of defendant to pay attorney's fees is minimal and the court finds it

reasonable that plaintiff should pay an additional amount to defendant for attorney's fees in the
amount of SI0,000. In making this award, the court has considered the fcts incurred on appeal.
This amount, combined with the prior amount plaintiff was ordered to pay, shall mean that
plaintiff shall pay to defendant a total amount of SI 5.000 towards her attorney's fees. The court
finds that this is an equitable amount concerning the incomes of the parties and the other matters
discussed above.
51.

The court recognizes that each party is responsible for the payment of fees

incurred independent of this award.
From the foregoing findings of fact, the court now makes the following:
Conclusions of Law
1.

The original findings of fact, conclusions of law, and decree in this matter should

be amended to delete the requirement that defendant pay one-half of the First Interstate Bank
obligation and one-half of the deficiency incurred in connection with the sale of the home.

2.

The alimony award of SI,500 per month for one year from the date of trial and

SI .000 per month for three years thereafter was proper and is affirmed.
3.

Plaintiff should be ordered to pay the costs of tuition and books for defendant for

a period of nine quarters at the University of Utah or a comparable university, providing such
education is completed within five years of January 31, 1995, to assist defendant in enhancing
her earning potential.
4.

Plaintiff should be ordered to pay to defendant additional alimony in the amount

of S500 per month while defendant is a fully matriculated student for a maximum of nine
quarters to be completed within five years following the date of this order.
5.

Plaintiff should be ordered to pay to defendant additional attorney's fees in the

amount of SI 0,000.
DATED this

1

.1995.
/ ^ " t V T H E COURT: V-

JUDGE

D.AVID

si YQ^ft^

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to be delivered, by hand, to the following, this 14th
day of February. 1995:
Roger D. Sandack, Esq.
First Interstate Plaza. Suite 400
170 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
C^C. <-
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ELLEN MAYCOCK-2131
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK, L.L.C
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Eighth Floor, Bank One Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2034
Telephone: (801)531-7090

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
GLEN P. WILLEY,
Plaintiff.
vs.

ROSALIND ANN JOHNSON WILLEY.

-7/W
ORDER AMENDING
DECREE OF DIVORCE
ON REMAND

S

U

Civil No. 91 490 0101 D A ^ " ^
Judse David S. Youn°

^

°~^

Defendant.

The above-entitled matter came before the court for hearing on remand from the Court of
Appeals on November 17, 1994. Plaintiff was present and represented by his counsel, Ellen
Maycock, and defendant was present and represented by her counsel, Roger D. Sandack. The
court having heard the testimony of witnesses, received exhibits, and heretofore entered its
findings of fact and conclusions of law,
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED
as follows:
1.
SI 0.000.

Plaintiff is ordered to pay to defendant additional attorney's fees in the amount of

^
0 a

°'

>

2.

Defendant shall not be required to pay one-half of the First Interstate Bank

obligation and one-half of the deficiency incurred in connection with the sale of the marital
residence.

The amount of SI8,840.86, representing defendant's original share of these

obligations, shall be considered to be awarded to her.
3.

In the event that defendant decides to continue her education, plaintiff is ordered

to pay tuition and books for a period of nine quarters for defendant at the University of Utah or a
comparable university. Defendant must complete this education within five years of January' 31,
1995. In addition, during the time that defendant is a fully-matriculated student at the university,
plaintiff shall pay to her S500 per month as additional alimony.
4.

Except as set forth in this order, the original findings of fact, conclusions of law,

and decree of divorce entered January 14, 1992, shall remain in full force and effect.
DATED this 7 ^ 3 a y of

/f(tui

1995.
1B\\THE

COURT:.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER
AMENDING DECREE OF DIVORCE ON REMAND to be delivered by hand to the
following, this 14th day of February, 1995:
Roger D. Sandack. Esq.
First Interstate Plaza, Suite 400
170 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
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EXHIBIT
Willey v. Willey
SUMMARY OF PARTIES* MONTHLY EXPENSES

Item

Paul Willey

Rent

$

Ros & Family

Ros

610.00

$1.,100.00

$

246.83

800.00

246.83

83.00

120.00

83.00

7.50

7.50

7.50

Incidentals

200.00

500.00

200.00

Dry Cleaning

21.00

61.00

21.00

Parking

55.00

.00

.00

Auto payments

793.73

381.83

381.83

Gas Maint. & Tax

163.37

250.00

163.37

Utilities

40.00

224.00

40.00

Telephone

48.30

40.45

40.4,5

Entertainment

75.00

240.00

75.00

Unreimbursed
Medical & Dental

.00

800.00

660.00

Personal
Counseling

.00

100.00

60.00

19.43

19.43

19.43

.00

30.00

30.00

40.00

80.00

40.00

$2 ,403.16

$4 ,754.21

$2 ,678.41

Food

610.00

Insurance:
Auto
Apartment

Newspaper &
subscriptions
Pet care
Housecleaning
TOTALS
11700

I i DEFENDANT'S
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